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READING CASEY: STRUCTURING THE WOMAN'S
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Robert D. Goldstein*
In this Article, Professor Goldstein argues that the primary concerns of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey's joint opinion were expressive, not regulatory, in
nature: to allow the state more leeway to structure the woman's decisionmaking
process and to engage in its own speech regardingher exercise of her procreative
choice. To this end, he identifies three models by which the state can engage in
such structuring: the autonomy informed consent model, the dialogical model, and
the government speech model. He then analyzes Casey in light of each model to
understand what limits Casey places on state abortion regulation. He also develops
an argument for the special speech rights of the learned professions in order to
discuss the right of the physician to counter the state's message, even when the
state funds the physician's speech under Rust v. Sullivan. In conclusion, he offers
his own suggestions about the appropriate subjects of a state-sponsored conversation about abortion.
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I. INTRODUCTION: CASEY'S EXPRESSIVE CONCERNS
In the shock following the Supreme Court's decision in PlannedParenthood v. Casey,' both sides claimed victory, both claimed defeat: Roe upheld
yet again, but undone. Roe gutted as expected, but still affirmed.
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, who took the unusual course
of issuing a jointly authored plurality opinion,2 formed a majority with Justices Stevens and Blackmun3 to reject the calls of those in the dissent to

2

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922
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overrule Roe v. Wade Instead, the joint opinion reaffirmed the "core" of
Roe, while discarding the trimester scheme in favor of an undue burden
test. 5 As the narrowest opinion supporting the Court's judgment, Casey's
joint opinion establishes current doctrine.6 But what does that opinion
mean?
A. Preview
On .a first and early reading, the joint opinion in Casey appeared to
some to renew the invitation extended to the states in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services7 to regulate abortion services in a multiplicity of ways.
Nevertheless, according to Justice Scalia, the Court in Casey did so in an
unprincipled and ad hoc manner, through a contentless undue burden test
that could mean only what a majority of Justices happened to say it meant
in a particular case. 8 Subsequent commentary on the case has focused on
the relation of the undue burden test to other constitutional doctrines, or on

criticizing Casey's specific holdings.9
This Article provides a different reading of the joint opinion and one
that offers a more coherent and intellectually satisfying understanding of the
law of abortion. On this reading, Casey strongly reaffirms Roe and maintains a substantial continuity with the regime Roe created, albeit with the
undue burden test. That undue burden test, this Introduction argues, should

(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in

part).
p 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held
that the decision to have an abortion
is a privacy right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 152-54. Under Roe,
during the first trimester, the decision to abort belongs exclusively to the woman and
her physician. From the end of the first trimester to the point of viability, the state may
regulate abortion to protect maternal health. After viability, the state may prohibit abortion except when the mother's life or health is in danger. Id. at 164-65.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79.
' See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). As the narrowest of the
three opinions supporting Roe, Casey's joint opinion is understood to establish the theory and standards of the Court, because there were five Justices who were prepared to go
at least as far as that opinion in limiting state restrictions on abortion choice.
' 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
8 Casey, 505 U.S. at 984-92 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
9 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994); Jane M. Cohen, A
Jurisprudenceof Doubt: DeliberativeAutonomy and Abortion, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 175 (1992); Lynn D. Wardle, Thomas Jefferson v. Casey, HUM. LIFE REV., Summer
1994, at 49. For a review of lower court cases following Casey, see Sandra L. Tholen
& Lisa Baird, Comment, Con Law Is as Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 971 (1995).
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not be read as inviting wide-open balancing of amorphous factors in which
judges freely expand or contract abortion regulation depending on their
personal predilections. Instead, the joint opinion's central concern was to enhance the state's power to structure the decisionmaking process by which
the woman exercises her lawful authority to terminate her pregnancy and
hence to regulate her procreativity (and sexuality). The Justices apparently
believed that, given City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc." and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians& Gynecologists," leeway for such structuring required an alteration in Roe's trimester
structure in favor of their undue burden test.
Even if not central, permitting such structuring was one among several
concerns of the Justices. Thus whether this Introduction successfully makes
out its case that this concern was central leaves unaffected this Article's
primary task-carried out in Parts II-IV--of analyzing the several ways in
which a state may structure a woman's decisionmaking process. This Article
will advance three models of state regulation of a decisionmaking process:
(1) in Part II, the autonomy informed-consent model, wherein state regulation seeks to enhance a person's informed autonomous choice; (2) in Part
III, the dialogical model, in which the state seeks to enhance a
(reenvisioned) autonomy by strategically arranging dialogical opportunities
for a person (with the public, her spouse, or her parents on the facts of
Casey); and (3) in Part IV, the government speech model, in which the
state, indifferent to a person's interests, seeks to persuade or reeducate her.
In considering the various forms that state structuring may take, this Article
will explore the limits upon state intervention that may be found in the
internal logic of each of the models' rationales, in the words of the Casey
joint opinion, and in other legal doctrines, especially those related to government speech. 2 Part IV will also sketch at length an argument for the
special free speech interests of the learned professions in order to explain
why the state may not constrain or decline to fund a physician's speech to
his patient, even if such speech undermines the state's message.
In developing this reading of Casey, this Article will call upon the work
of Mary Ann Glendon 3 to emphasize the opinion's underlying expressive
concerns, and then, in Parts II-IV, repeatedly enlist the aid of a foil-a
'0

462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; see discussion

infra note 62 and accompanying text.
" 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; see discussion
infra note 62 and accompanying text.
1 Exploration of whether the tripartite analysis employed here--of individual autonomy, dialogical communication, and government speech-may be useful in analyzing
other areas of government regulation-e.g., the right to die, marriage, and divorce-must be postponed until another time.
13 MARY ANN

GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN

FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES

(1987).
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hypothetical state attorney general-who, rather more passionately than his
liberal respondent, will set forth and clarify a range of arguments on behalf
of the Pennsylvania statute that Casey reviewed.
This is the roadmap. What of the destination? At the most practical
level, this Article concludes that the statute in Casey reaches close to the
limits of what Casey's rationale permits.
At the most general level, I suggest that the joint opinion seeks to resolve the deeply divisive abortion controversy in a very interesting way: it
continues to recognize the woman's ultimate control over her reproductive
life, but gives expression to the values of those who oppose abortion by
allowing more speech. It does so by granting leeway to the government to
voice its own opposition to abortion. Responding to those abortion opponents who may doubt the rationality and independence of the approximately
1.5 million women in this country who annually decide to abort, 4 the joint
opinion also enables the state to try to enhance the autonomy of those women by increasing the information at their disposal and their opportunity for
reflection.
Lurking within this solution of more speech are knotty philosophical
issues about autonomy and our understanding of the self. As a practical
legal matter, however, when a state employs its symbolic and material resources to implement a rigorous informed consent process, it risks sacrificing liberty to an elusive ideal of autonomy, and betraying autonomy in favor
of its own partisan goals. To avoid this, courts need to bring practical judgment to bear on a state's regulation by considering our actual legal practices
regarding informed consent and the express wishes of the individuals whose
autonomy is at stake. The question must be whether the mandated procedure
implements, for those affected, "autonomy-in-fact."
Quite apart from its interest in fostering the autonomy of its citizens, the
state also has the authority to speak in favor of the values that its democratically elected officials seek to advance. Nevertheless, there are limits on how
forcefully and under which circumstances the state may address the pregnant
woman. Such limits are derived from doctrines regarding government speech
and, ultimately, from the self-governance of citizens that a democratic state
must not undermine.
In Casey, the locus of the state's efforts to speak and enhance autonomy
is the doctor-patient relationship. As a general matter quite apart from the
issue of abortion, the state protects autonomous choice and individual wellbeing in part by fostering and maintaining the autonomy of the professions
and a private space for client-professional contact. In this space, the learned
professions bring society's knowledge and solicitude to bear upon funda-

'4

Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Induced Termination of

Pregnancy Before and After Roe v. Wade: Trends in the Mortality and Morbidity of

Women, 268 JAMA 3231, 3232 (1992) [hereinafter Abortion Trends].
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mentally important aspects of a person's life and liberty-in this instance, a
woman's bodily and psychological well-being. Because the learned professions are institutions of knowledge, Part IV will argue that their practices
enjoy First Amendment protection. Thus, autonomy as well as free speech
may be jeopardized when the state intrudes on this relationship.
In its general approach, the joint opinion implies that the liberal state
may play a substantial role in communicating with its competent adult citizens in order to aid their autonomous choices and to convey collectively
determined values. Accordingly, Casey affords an occasion to consider more
extensively the possibilities and limits of government expression and its
structuring of the individual's decisionmaking processes. This understanding,
however, requires a more detailed exploration than is usually needed to explicate opinions that focus simply on state constraints upon liberty.15

"' I shall presume a familiarity with the holding in Casey; those interested in a quick
review of the opinion may consult the following. In Casey, the Court considered a statute from Pennsylvania which required:
(1) That a woman obtaining an abortion must sign a statement, on pain of
perjury, indicating that she had notified her husband of her intention to abort
unless she also affirmed that her spouse: was not the father; could not be located
after diligent effort; had impregnated her in a spousal sexual assault which she
had reported to the police; or would likely inflict bodily injury upon her if notified.
(2) A 24-hour waiting period before an abortion and after the physician had
orally provided the woman with the following information and received her informed consent regarding: the nature of the procedure, its risks, and alternatives
that a reasonable patient would consider material; the probable gestational age of
the "unborn child"; and the medical risks associated with continuing her pregnancy to term. In addition, the woman had to certify in writing that she had been
offered a brochure from the state. The brochure was required to be "objective,
non-judgmental and designed to convey only accurate scientific information"
about: fetal development at two-week gestational increments including realistic
pictures at each stage; the possibility of fetal survival; and abortion techniques
and risks. Furthermore, the brochure was to contain information about social
services and agencies that could assist in prenatal through neonatal care and in
adoption, and information about assistance in seeking child support and other
sources of support.
(3) That a minor seeking an abortion obtain the informed consent of one of
her parents; although the statute provided for a judicial bypass option if the minor
preferred.
(4) That emergency abortions might be performed without complying with
the three consent provisions above.
(5) That abortion providers report certain data concerning patients.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 902-11 (1992).
In reviewing this statute, the Justices divided as follows: largely in dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and White voted to uphold the statute in
its entirety and to overrule Roe, thus demoting the liberty interest of women from a
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fundamental right to the general interest of doing what one wants free of arbitrary state
interference. Id. at 951-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). That would permit the state to regulate and forbid abortion to further almost any interest that it might assert, except that a statute prohibiting abortions to protect the life of the woman presumably would be impermissible.
Adhering to Roe and its progeny, and applying strict scrutiny to review the state's
regulation of the woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, Justice
Blackmun would have struck down all these provisions. Id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens adhered to a position close to Blackmun's, but in place of an explicit doctrinal commitment to the trimester scheme, he closely scrutinized the purpose,
effect, and narrow-crafting of these government infringements upon a woman's autonomy. Id. at 914-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Except as to
the medical reporting provision, he voted to overturn the statute. ld. at 917-18 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In a jointly written opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter voted to strike
down the spousal notice provision, but to uphold the informed consent provisions for
adult women, including a 24-hour waiting period and the brochure requirement. Id. at
882-87. In addition, they voted to uphold, in the case of minors, parental notice and
consent with an alternative judicial bypass procedure. Id. at 899.
The joint opinion reaffirmed the "core holding" of Roe: that, until viability, a woman has the ultimate authority to determine whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at
879. Thereafter, the state can forbid abortion except in cases where the woman seeks to
abort to protect her life or health. Id.
Nevertheless, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter rejected Roe's trimester
structure, which they read as precluding the state from furthering its interest in the
potential life of the fetus prior to viability. In place of the trimester structure, they proposed to review state regulations to determine whether they have the purpose or effect
of creating a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect abortion. Id. at
877. If the regulation is not such an obstacle, then it does not offend their undue burden
test and survives. Id. What this analysis permits, they assert, is the expression by the
state of its concern for potential fetal life from the start of pregnancy. Id. at 878. (In a
subsequent opinion, Justices O'Connor and Souter elaborated upon what constitutes an
undue burden. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014
(1993).)
In so voting, both Justice O'Connor and (even more so) Justice Kennedy, retreated
from positions they had previously taken that were far more hostile to Roe. See Webster
v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517-21 (1989) (plurality); City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452-61 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. In an extended discussion of
the doctrine of stare decisis, the joint opinion explained that these Justices felt constrained to uphold Roe. They as much as said that all or some of them would not have
voted for Roe had they been on the Court in 1973. Nonetheless, the opinion sympathetically explained the liberty interest Roe protects as:
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy ....

At the heart of liber-

ty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
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B. Glendon's Expressive Critiqueof Roe
Professor Mary Ann Glendon's well-known critique of the law of abortion that Roe established helps to clarify the concerns of the plurality opinion. 6 Because her work was "in the air" in legal circles at the time of
Casey, it is plausible that the Justices were familiar with her work, although
it was not cited. In any case, her critique usefully organizes the plurality's
own critique.
For Glendon, the expressive function of law is as important-and in
some cases, like abortion, more important-as its social control and ordering
function. Law should express the common sentiments that bind a society
and regulate its social life. Furthermore, the law teaches through its expression. 7 From this viewpoint, she argues, Roe strained the fabric of our society in several ways. First, it permitted abortions in circumstances that were
inconsistent with the family values, although not necessarily the practices, of
many, and perhaps a majority of Americans. Second, Roe offered a set of
reasons for its holding that so offended the beliefs of many as to fracture
the body politic. Third, by treating the matter as one of constitutional right,
it made legislative compromise unavailable to aid the process of societal
reintegration."i
The Wrong Message. For Glendon, by permitting abortion, Roe teaches a
message that is not only inconsistent with dominant values, but is mistaken
and hostile to family life: that relations are terminable at will, that dependence does not require care, and that self-satisfaction counts for more than
duty and obligation. Thus, she claims, it reinforces the individualism and
rational calculation of the marketplace that American society already takes
to extremes, and does so in the very center of family life. Glendon blames
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.
The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851-52.
Following Casey, Justice White, a long time opponent of Roe, and then Justice
Blackmun, Roe's author, retired, to be replaced by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Al-

though one cannot be sure, it would appear that the Court's current composition is more
hospitable to Roe than when Casey was decided. Nevertheless, it is likely that, with

Justice Blackmun gone, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer will in future cases subscribe to
the joint opinion in order to create a working majority.
16 See GLENDON, supra note 13. For a review of Glendon's book, see Jane Maslow
Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights,

98 YALE L.J. 1235 (1989).

For a consideration of comparative West German materials, some of which Glendon
considers, see Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right
to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273 (1995).
17 GLENDON, supra note 13, at 6-9, 140-42.
18 See id. at 41-47.
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the sorry state of children, and especially children of divorced and single

on this individualism that the law of abortion and divorce expressmothers,
19
es.
A Divisive Message. Far more significant for Glendon than the error of
Roe's message is its divisiveness: the language and ideas of the opinion are
anathema to portions of the American public as to prevent their accommodation to the legal regime it adopted.' Under this view, the real problem with
Roe is not that abortions are performed in this society-they always have

been performed in large numbers; nor that the law permits abortions-some
states permitted elective abortion even before Roe.2 Far more significantly,
the law says that it is permitting abortions to be performed, and says so
without expressing regret or concern for the fetus and without expressing
restraint upon the woman's choice. 2 The law fails for Glendon because it
does not contain within it the expression of values that speak to the antichoice members of society.' In developing this critique, Glendon advocates the French model in preference to Roe. According to her, French law requires a woman to be "in distress" in order to have access to an abortion,
but the same law makes the pregnant woman the sole judge of whether she
is in distress, during the first ten weeks of pregnancy.' Thus the law re"9 Id. at 51-58. I believe that such a claim is fundamentally mistaken, and so argued
in an essay that developed at the same moment in the abortion debate as Glendon's
book. It is, instead, the anti-choice position that reflects a position of radical atomism
and ignores the nature of our first community, that of mother and child. In contrast, a
regime of abortion choice can express and embody the importance of respecting mother-love, and fostering responsible care and familial commitments. See ROBERT D.
GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION: A LEGAL INTERPRETATION 90-100 (1988)
(proposing a relational analysis of the woman and fetus and of the abortion liberty, with
the pregnant woman as the dyadic representative of her pregnancy).
' GLENDON, supra note 13, at 40-42, 45-47.
21 Id. at 48-49.
' Justice Blackmun in Roe may have thought that he was sensitive to this issue by
rejecting bodily autonomy as the basis of the woman's liberty, and by describing the
woman's choice as limited by the physician. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-66
(1973). He and other Justices apparently saw the physician as embodying values that
are life-affirming and protective of the dependent and vulnerable. Nevertheless, this
view has meant little or nothing to opponents of Roe.
' GLENDON, supra note 13, at 46-47. As Judge Guido Calabresi similarly claimed,
anti-choice citizens could have tolerated a decision that a woman's right trumps fetal
right but could not abide having their valuation of the fetus read completely out of our
fundamental law. It was not the outcome of Roe but the Court's method of excluding
the fetus from all constitutional consideration, of saying, "Your metaphysics are not part
of our constitution," that was the affront. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrlTUDES, AND THE LAW 95-96 (1985).
2 GLENDON, supra note 13, at 15-22. Furthermore, "in France, the state pays 70

percent of the cost of nontherapeutic abortions and the entire cost of those that are medically necessary." Id. at 17.
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sponds to both sides of the debate: autonomy is preserved, while the principle is enacted that only a serious reason justifies aborting, thereby expressing concern for the fetus.' It has long been observed that hypocrisy is
an essential ingredient of society, and Glendon unblinkingly embraces it
because in saying one thing even while doing another, the law affirms and
teaches enduring values in an imperfect world populated by persons holding
a plurality of views.26
Preventing Democratic Integration. As the law serves in large measure
an expressive function, so democratic lawmaking serves an integrative function by enlisting conflicting groups into a common process that binds them
to each other and to the state. Glendon argues that by constitutionalizing the
abortion issue and allowing states so little room to maneuver under the strict
scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court has denied the community the opportunity to reintegrate and heal its value fragmentation through a legislative
compromise. Such compromise would minimize conflict by expressing competing values in legislation and by integrating disputants into an ongoing
legislative process.27
The concerns of the joint opinion in Casey seem to parallel Glendon's.
First, by claiming to reduce the level of its scrutiny of state legislation, the
joint opinion would afford the legislature greater room to bargain over outId. at 15-21.
2
Kristin Luker's excellent book, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, makes a
similar point. She shows how in the first half of the twentieth century the medical pro25

fession served to contain value conflicts by performing a number of abortions behind a

professional veil that permitted physicians to claim that abortion protected the woman's
life. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 40-48 (1984). In

the 1950s and 60s, however, technical advances so greatly reduced the occasions in
which an abortion was life-saving that this medical justification became an implausible

explanation for the large number of abortions actually performed. Id. at 54-58. At that
point, anti-choice physicians and prosecutors were no longer willing to defer to the

judgments of those physicians who held very different values from their own. As a
result, physicians sought reform of abortion statutes to establish a new standard that
would continue to protect them in the performance of abortions. Id. at 73-91. Had such
reform worked, doctors might have contained the conflict even as medical practice
became transformed in some states into a regime of elective abortion. This elite reform
process did not manage to contain value conflict, in part because Roe forced the value
conflict into the open and led to the enlisting of the "laity"-the citizenry-in the debate on each side of the abortion conflict. There followed a nationwide contest of grassroots politics in which individuals previously uninvolved in the matter felt conscripted

into the debate by virtue of their attachments to the conflicting world views at issue. Id.
at 90-91. For the functionalist, such public airing of irreconcilable conflict is a sociological sin.
27 GLENDON, supra note 13, at 45-47; see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 344-52 (1992). Some may variously object that such compromise is
on the backs of women, especially poor women, or the limbs of fetuses-but that is
neither here nor there to a functionalist critique.

1996]

READING CASEY

797

comes. Any move in that direction responds to the critique that Roe reduced
the integrative work of politics. Second, any additional restrictions on abortion would in effect "express" the counter-values opposed to abortion. Presumably, were Glendon right, these changes would reduce the degree of
societal fracture over abortion, a goal that the joint opinion seeks.2
Yet, if the Court were to apply the undue burden test so as to defer to
various legislative decisions that substantially restrict access to abortion, it
would be confronted with the unanswerable criticism that it is applying an
ad hoc and subjective standard without predictable content. Furthermore,
such deference would produce results that are inconsistent with the
plurality's assertion that the woman retains the ultimate choice regarding
abortion. Thus, it is unclear how far the three Justices are prepared to respond to a critique like Glendon's by allowing politics to regulate abortion
while still claiming to preserve the ultimate choice of the pregnant woman.
Further, with respect to the law's expressive function, what balance between
words-government speech-and action-government regulation-will the
plurality strike? To answer these questions, we need first to catalogue and
analyze the various kinds of regulation that states can be expected to adopt
in response to Casey's invitation.
C. Abortion Regulations: Prohibition,Burden, and Speech
Abortion regulation may be divided into three sorts: limitations upon the
reasons for abortion and its timing; burdening regulations mostly of a medical nature; and regulation of the woman's decisionmaking process.
1. Limiting the Reasons for Abortion and Its Timing
Roe's regime provided that a woman is the judge of her reasons and that
the state may not restrict the reasons that justify a woman's choice to have
an abortion.29 Because Casey reaffirms that the woman has ultimate deci-

2 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (asserting the Court's ca-

pacity to settle fundamental questions dividing the nation). It remains to be seen whether the legislative victories that anti-choice groups have had in various states serve to reduce the political venom and stridency of abortion politics. Certainly the recent murders
and shootings in abortion clinics and of medical personnel do not suggest that the societal fracture may be healed easily by politics, although these may be exceptional events.
29 Thus, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S 179 (1973), the Court affirmed a district court
judgment that effectively struck down a Georgia statute which, following the Model
Penal Code, allowed physicians to perform an abortion only to protect the life and
health of the woman, in cases of rape and incest, and in cases of substantial fetal deformity. Id. at 183.
Under Roe, then, it would be impermissible to forbid an abortion undertaken to
harvest cells for a brain implant in a patient with Parkinson's Disease, although Roe
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sional control, it follows Roe in forbidding regulation of the reasons that
permit an abortion prior to viability.3" One obscure sentence in the plurality
opinion, however, might be interpreted as allowing the French model that
Glendon favors in which the state statute expresses guidance to women as to
permissible reasons, but, having spoken, leaves the ultimate decision in each
woman's hands prior to fetal viability: "Regardless of whether exceptions

are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viabili'3
ty. '

Casey also reaffirmed Roe's holding that after viability, a state is permitted-though not required-to restrict abortion to circumstances in which the
woman's life or health are in jeopardy.32 In response to Roe's allocation of
decisional power to the woman prior to fetal viability, some legislatures

alone would not foreclose prohibiting the subsequent operation. Equally impermissible
would be a prohibition on abortion for fetal defects, such as trisonomy 21 or even
worse. Impermissible too would be a prohibition on abortion for sex or race selection.
A prohibition on abortion as a means of birth control would also fail because of Roe,
and because such a prohibition would be either tautological and meaningless, or a complete prohibition on abortion.
30 Accordingly, since Casey, lower courts have struck down statutes that have forbidden abortion except to protect the woman's life, or in cases of promptly reported
incest and rape. See, e.g., Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding unconstitutional, on the basis of Casey, a Louisiana statute that restricted abortion to
instances involving a threat to the woman's life, reported rape and incest, the removal
of a dead fetus, or where separation is in the interest of the fetus), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 972 (1992); Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366
(9th Cir.) (striking down in a pre-Casey decision, a Guam statute that forbade all abortions except to save the woman's life), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (post-Casey
denial); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992) (striking down a statute
that also prohibited abortions prior to viability), affid in part, rev'd in part, 61 F.3d
1493 (10th Cir. 1995); see also In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1 (Okla.
1992) (preventing vote on initiative that would restrict abortions to cases of grave impairment of physical or mental health (excluding mere stress or embarrassment), rape,
incest, or grave fetal defect), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993); cf Wyoming Nat'l
Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281 (Wyo. 1994) (declining to
prevent initiative that would unconstitutionally limit reasons for abortion because other
portions related to funding were presumptively valid).
31 Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
32 Despite this interpretation of Casey in the text, some lower courts since Casey
have upheld statutes that restrict post-viability abortion to occasions of grave threat to a
woman's health or organ systems. See, e.g., Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 874 n.1.
Prior to Casey, the Court upheld a requirement that a second physician be consulted
in post-viability terminations, unless compliance with the requirement would interfere
with immediate emergency care required by the woman's health. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc., v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). Casey presumably
also would permit similar regulations.
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sought to establish a fixed definition of viability, and to forbid elective
abortion thereafter.33 The Court rejected such legislative attempts to presume irrebuttably that a fixed point in development constitutes viability, and
held that viability involved an individualized medically competent determination by the attending physician.' In reaffirming the viability line, the
Casey plurality observed that viability only "sometimes" occurs at twentythree to twenty-four weeks;35 and it gave no hint that it was altering this
previous requirement of individualized determination. To the contrary, setting such a rigid viability line would violate Casey by creating an absolute
barrier to elective abortions.
Casey thus left untouched Roe's allocation-until fetal viability-to the
pregnant woman of the decision of whether to go to term or terminate her
pregnancy for whatever reason.
2. Taxing Abortions: Medical Regulations That Make Abortion More
Expensive and Less Accessible
There are, however, a variety of state regulations short of prohibition
that can, intentionally or not, make abortion more expensive and daunting.
These typically take the form of "medical" regulations,36 although many
"3These debates regarding pregnancies in weeks 21 to 24 are relevant to very few
women-under 15,000 annually. Most often, this time frame applies to women who are
carrying fetuses with substantial handicaps, who had not been properly diagnosed by a
physician as pregnant, or who are very young or very troubled and had denied their
pregnancies. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 60-61, 175 n.60.
"' See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). In a previous case, the Court upheld a requirement of ultrasound testing after 20 weeks where medically appropriate for
the determination of viability. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S 490
(1989). Although a plurality of Justices used this provision as an occasion to propose
overruling Roe, id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(observing that "the plurality and Justice Scalia would overrule Roe (the first silently,
the other explicitly)"), in fact that requirement was entirely consistent with medical
practice and provided a rational, minimally burdensome way of implementing Roe's
viability standard.
" See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. Nonetheless, since Casey, Utah adopted a flat ban on
all elective abortions at 23 weeks LMP (since last menstrual period or 21 weeks since
ovulation), even though there are almost no fetuses that survive as babies at 23 weeks,
and even fewer (perhaps none at all) that, can survive unimpaired by the medical technology that will be brought to bear upon them to maintain their vital signs. This was
struck down in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing
district court on grounds of unseverability).
36 Some regulations do not take the form of medical regulation. Zoning and land use
regulations that intentionally exclude abortion clinics should invariably constitute impermissible undue burdens. See, e.g., P.L.S. Partners v. City of Cranston, 696 F. Supp.
788, 796-97 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that classification of an abortion facility as a hospital, thereby requiring a special use permit, impermissibly burdened a woman's decision

800

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:3

have little medical justification.37 Such regulations do not make any particular abortion safer. Moreover, abortion is so much safer than childbirth
that imposing these burdens creates a perverse incentive on women's health
choices by making the safer choice-abortion-more difficult, or by creating a less-safe black-market in cheaper, unregulated abortions.
By virtue of its lesser standard of review, the Casey joint opinion appeared ready to uphold more such regulations than were permissible under
Roe's trimester structure: burdening regulations that have neither the purpose nor the effect of placing a substantial obstacle upon a woman's choice

to have an abortion); West Side Women's Servs. v. City of Cleveland, 573 F. Supp.
504, 517-24 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance that prevented
the establishment of abortion clinics in retail business districts).
Particular aspects of the tort system also may constitute impermissible undue burdens. For example, presumed damages for violation of a statutory informed consent
regulation of abortion, or excessive damage awards against abortion providers arising
from systematic efforts of anti-abortion groups should both run afoul of the undue burden test and the principle, enunciated in the First Amendment context in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that the Constitution limits the burdens the
tort system may impose upon the exercise of a fundamental right. A state's failure to
provide adequate tort protection to women's procreative choices, equal to the protection
afforded other comparable interests, should similarly offend Casey. In this regard, it
should be noted that Pennsylvania has done away with wrongful life suits. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3805(b) (Supp. 1995); see also Julie F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your
Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims for Wrongful Life and Wrongful
Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 235 (1995).
" Following Roe, the Court struck down most of the so-called medical regulations
that it reviewed, including requirements that abortions be performed only in a hospital
or a free-standing surgical facility that met substantial requirements concerning size and
equipment; or only after consultation with a second physician; or, in the case of second
trimester abortions, that only certain methods among those regularly employed by physicians be used. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416 (N.D. Tex. 1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Before Webster, the Court had upheld regulations that required certain minor medical recordkeeping and a pathology lab report on the fetus, although this added approximately $19.40 to the cost of each abortion. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City,
Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983) (noting that the "substantial benefit"
justified the "small cost"). Casey itself upheld one such regulation: a detailed medical
reporting requirement that increased recordkeeping burdens by increasing the amount of
information reported, thus increasing the risk, in the case of a breach of confidentiality,
that the privacy of patient and referring doctor would be compromised. Casey, 505 U.S.
at 900-01.
" Abortion Trends, supra note 14, at 3235 (noting that the mortality rate from legal
abortions is "more than 10 times lower than the maternal mortality rate"); Donald P.
Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1323, 1410 (1995).
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would survive. The joint opinion could advance one of two justifications for
upholding such unnecessary and burdensome regulations: it could assert
deference to the presumed rationality of the legislature's judgment about the
woman's medical safety, despite medical evidence introduced in court to the
contrary; or alternatively, it could find that the regulations further the state's
interest in the potential life of the fetus by creating a financial or psychological disincentive to choose abortion.
This latter justification would explain the significance of the joint
opinion's rejection of the trimester system so that it could embrace the proposition that a state's interest in the fetus is strong and operative prior to
viability. Any burden on the pregnant woman rationally-that is, instrumentally-would further that state's interest in the fetus. Nevertheless, if such
burdening regulations can thus be justified as furthering the state's interest
in the fetus, also justifiable would be a sin tax on abortion, an additional
exaction beyond what a well-functioning medical system requires to supply
the service safely. The straightforward question then is whether Casey
would permit the imposition of a $100 or $1000 tax on abortions. Although
such a tax would not advance a woman's health-indeed it would harm
it-such a tax would directly implement what the joint opinion treats as the
state's substantial interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.
Under one reading of Casey, the Court should uphold such a tax so long
as it is not so high--or intended to be so high-as in the Court's judgment
to constitute a substantial obstacle to abortion choice for some class of
women. Better reasons, however, should lead the Court to reject this reading
of Casey and to find that unnecessary state rules which merely burden
choice cannot be justified as rational medical regulations.
First, the joint opinion indicated that the Court will reject such burdening regulations when it stated that the Court will reject "unnecessary health
regulations."39 "Unnecessariness" is a stricter test than "irrationality." Although the plurality's standard may involve some greater deference to legislative judgment concerning medical advisability, "unnecessariness" still
involves closely reviewing regulatory impositions on abortion.
Second, the political and economic contexts in which such burdensome
regulations would be adopted would make claims of legislative rationality
less plausible. The principle in medicine today is cost containment. Surgery
increasingly occurs in free-standing clinics or in physicians' offices. 0 Similarly, medical services are increasingly delivered by medical generalists or
non-physicians.4 ' Congress's recent rejection of Clinton's health care re-

9 Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
See Frederic J.Entin, Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an AppropriateAntitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 142 (1994).
41 Joseph Wharton, Who Cures When the Doctor Is Out?, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1993, at
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form plan appears to reflect a national choice with respect to all medical
services for competition and regulation by private insurers (rather than by
the state); this will make costly state regulation of abortion appear, appropriately so, unwarranted and irrational, even to a Court that shrinks from the
strict scrutiny of Roe.
Finally, a tax upon the exercise of a fundamental right-a right that
Casey reaffirmed-is sufficiently obnoxious and unfair in its distributional
consequences to deserve the same treatment as the Court has accorded the
poll tax for voting and license fees meant to burden speech.42 A regulatory
tax meant to discourage the exercise of a fundamental right (in this case by
enriching physicians) should simply be impermissible.
3.

Casey's Preference for More Speech: Regulating the Decisionmaking
Process

A third form of state regulation focuses on the conditions under which a
woman makes her decision to have an abortion: with whom she must consult, how long she must wait, and what information she must hear. These
are the central concerns of the plurality opinion.
The undue burden test should not be seen as an invitation to adopt hostile legislation provided the legislature does not go "too far" in the eyes of
the Court. Rather, the joint opinion aims at an altogether different approach
to abortion regulation: to authorize more leeway for the states to structure
the woman's decisionmaking process, and to open up the expressive channels of speech to the pregnant woman while she is engaged in deliberation
about her choice. Thus, the opinion indicates:
[The state may take] steps to ensure that this choice is
thoughtful and informed ....

[T]he State may enact rules

and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there
are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can
be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to
full term and that there are procedures and institutions to
allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain
degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the
child herself ....

[The states may enact] a reasonable frame-

work for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.43

42

See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll

tax unconstitutional); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down
Pennsylvania law requiring a license in order to sell religious books and pamphlets door
to door).

"3 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
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Indeed, the opinion's general discussion of undue burden is interwoven
with a specific discussion of her decisional process-so interwoven as to
suggest that implicit in the undue burden test is a central concern with the
state's power to structure decisionmaking. For example, when the three
Justices set forth "guiding principles" to implement their opinion, they began by emphasizing speech and communication, not regulation:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing
so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has
that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to
persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal."
Elsewhere, the opinion indicates that the state may "show its concern for the
that a
life of the unborn '45 by enacting "[m]easures aimed at ensuring
46
fetus.
the
for
consequences
the
woman's choice contemplates
Nevertheless, the joint opinion insists, all such regulation and speech is
limited by this requirement: "the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it."' 47 This is the key to why the opinion can assert-without falling into hopeless contradiction-that the state may realize
both its interest in protecting the woman's health and the potential life of
the fetus before viability, while still allowing the woman ultimate authority
over her decision. The realization of these conflicting interests is possible
because the central premise of the undue burden test is that the state may
further its interest in the fetus before viability only by assuring the woman's
careful choice through structuring the decisionmaking process and by expressing ideas and communicating facts to educate and influence her. 48 A
Id. at 877 (citation omitted).

41 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.

at 869.

at 873.
at 877.

Id.
What follows, at length, places these quotations from the joint opinion in the context of an examination of the entire joint opinion, and offers a closer reading to show
how its elaboration of a general undue burden test for reviewing regulations, is so tightly intertwined with its focus on the state's power to structure a decisionmaking process
of informed consent, to which the state may add its own voice.
The first discussion of the opinion's approach to permissible regulation appears at
48
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the end of its Part I, where it reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe, including "the
right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability ... without undue
interference from the State, [because] the State's interests are not strong enough to
support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the
woman's effective right to elect the procedure." Id. at 846. The woman's right is a
practical one: state regulation cannot leave her with merely a formal right; it must be
one that she can effectively exercise. Strikingly, the opinion asserted that the state's two
"legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus ... do not contradict one another." Id. How is it possible for them not to conflict? Because the interest in the fetus justifies speech, not regulation.
The opinion next discussed its approach to regulation in Part IV. The first paragraph announced an expressive theme:
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State
cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal
development the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the
woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.
Id. at 869. Initially, the state may "show its concern," that is, engage in expression. By
contrast, later in fetal development, at viability, it may take effective action to restrict
the availability of abortion.
The next paragraph announced a secondary theme, the undue burden standard, noting that "it falls to us to give some real substance to the woman's liberty to determine
whether to carry her pregnancy to full term." Id. Shortly thereafter, the opinion noted
that the trimester scheme was adopted "to ensure that the woman's right to choose not
become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her choice
exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree ... that the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective." Id. at 872.
The very next paragraph, however, explains this assertion by returning to the expressive theme:
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from
taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the
earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to,
encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great
weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full
term and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted
children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to
raise the child herself. "'[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth."'
It follows that States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for
a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.
... Measures aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the
consequences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere with the right recognized in
Roe.
Id. at 872-73 (citations omitted). On the basis of this concern with government speech
and informed consent, the opinion next concluded that the trimester analysis must be
rejected. Id.
To clinch its argument in favor of increased state regulation, the opinion compared

1996]

READING CASEY

805

such involvement to the state's power to structure the exercise of the right to vote. Id.
The voting analogy is telling: although the state may not tax the decision to vote or try
to dissuade persons from voting, it may educate the voter.
Only after all this did the opinion turn to a more general statement of the undue
burden test as a replacement for the trimester scheme. Laws that serve a valid purpose
but have an "incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure
an abortion" are constitutional because they "in no real sense deprive[] women of the
ultimate decision" or involve "unwarranted" intrusions on a fundamental right. Id. at
874. By contrast, regulations that have more than that incidental effect and create a
substantial obstacle are impermissible as are laws that have the purpose of being a substantial obstacle or of "strik[ing] at the right itself." Id. This the opinion purported to
develop from general constitutional principles.
In addition to this general claim about undue burden analysis in constitutional law,
the opinion suggested a second flaw in the trimester scheme: it undervalues the state's
interest in fetal life from the start of pregnancy. Id. at 875. What does that interest
justify? The opinion again turned to the expressive and informed consent themes, observing that "before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat[ed] all governmental attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf of the potential life within her as
unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that
there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy." Id. at 876. As
previously noted in the text, such governmental influence on the woman's decision
might arise either from burdensome regulation or, alternatively, from the state's speech
and structuring of the decisional process. After another general statement of the undue
burden test, the opinion clearly opted for the latter alternative:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the. path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.
Id. at 877 (emphasis added). This observation explains the concluding paragraph of Part
I, quoted supra. Roe's reaffirmed principles do not conflict with the state's interest in
fetal life because the state can realize its interest in fetal life from the beginning of
pregnancy only by informing the woman's choice, not by burdening it; because Casey
preserves the woman's choice, educating her choice is the only means of protecting the
fetus.
To clinch the point, the same paragraph notes an earlier ambiguity in Justice
O'Connor's undue burden analysis in Akron, id. at 877 (citing City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 462-63 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
where it appeared that any regulation that discouraged abortion would survive scrutiny
because it would rationally further the state's interest in fetal life. The joint opinion
expressly rejected this interpretation by explaining that a law is unconstitutional if it
intends to impose an undue burden on a woman's choice as a means of rationally furthering its interest in fetal life. Id. Thus, to further its interest in fetal life, the state must
work with and through the woman's own choosing, and not in derogation of it.
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state, however, may not "express" its pronatalist sentiments by a regulatory
taxing of abortion or the building of other barriers to choice. As such, Casey
should be understood not as taking aim at Roe, but rather as a focused and
measured response to the limits that Thornburgh and Akron had placed upon
the state's regulation of the decisional process.49
Such focus makes sense. In a regime in which the woman has the ultimate choice, it naturally follows that the informed consent process plays a
centrally important role in protecting the woman and the integrity of her
decision.5 ° In addition, greater regulatory leeway here affords state officials
a way to express their opposing values and thus satisfy, as Glendon urged,
Identifying "[s]ome guiding principles" from the entire opinion, the next paragraph
continued the theme that the state can speak to inform the woman's decision:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to
be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose.
Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related
to that goal.
Id. at 877-78.
Finally, in identifying a second guiding principle two paragraphs later, the opinion
again linked the rejection of the trimester scheme to the state's interest in informed
consent and expression:
We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the
State's profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may
take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is
to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must
not be an undue burden on the right.
Id. at 878.

" Instead of returning to the issue of Roe and the trimester structure, the Casey joint
opinion might have been cast solely as overruling, in part, two more recent decisions of
the Court, Thornburgh and Akron, on the grounds that they were not compelled by Roe
and indeed had misapplied Roe's twin concerns of protecting a woman's decisional
autonomy and the state's power to regulate the medical profession for her safety. Had
the Casey opinion framed the issue in terms not of Roe but of Akron and Thornburgh,
there might have followed a more usefully focused discussion of the Justices' divergent
understandings about the nature of the medical profession, the state's power to regulate
the speech rights of professionals, and the limits of government speech. See Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 830 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.

Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 472 n.16 (1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at
833.
'0 Indeed there is no regime-even one that prohibits all abortion-in which the
state can realize any interest in the fetus except through the woman's autonomous
choice to love the infant if born. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 58-59.
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those of the electorate who oppose Roe. But it permits them to do so in a
straightforward and honest manner, rather than surreptitiously by means of a
regulatory tax on the abortion decision, which would impose a terrible
distributional inequality. Practically, for those who doubt the authenticity of
a woman's choice, the state's greater focus on her decisionmaking may
afford reassurance. Moreover, this focus draws our attention to the specific
ways women decide to terminate their pregnancies, which in turn may foster
useful and factually specific communication in our society about abortion.
Finally, to reiterate, were the plurality's "undue burden" test to apply
across the board to ease judicial review of a broad range of state abortion
regulations, it would be entirely amorphous and ad hoc, as courts would
seek to resolve just how far the state can realize its "interest in the previable
fetus" through building barriers to the provision of abortion services. By
contrast, if the test is understood to apply to the decisionmaking process
alone, principles about informed consent and government speech that would
give some coherence to the joint opinion's standard can be applied, and thus
afford subsequent guidance in implementing the undue burden test.
Clearly Casey's plurality opinion was centrally concerned with structuring the woman's decisionmaking process. The question of whether that was
its exclusive or primary concern may be left now (to be answered by future
opinions of the Court) in favor of exploring what such structuring means.
The remainder of this Article will examine this question through an elaboration of three models of how the state can structure decisionmaking: (1) in
Part II, the informed consent autonomy model, in which the goal is to further the woman's exercise of her autonomy through the provision of information; (2) in Part III, the dialogical model of decisionmaking, in which the
state structures a dialogue within a relevant community-such as a dialogue
with her husband-to enable the woman more adequately to realize herself
in relationship to her community in making her decision; and (3) in Part IV,
the government speech model, in which the government speaks to persuade
the woman, regardless of what she wants or is in her self-interest. In exploring these three models this Article will ask: to permit the kind of communications that Casey authorized, which of these models must the Court have
adopted, and what limits on state power can be identified with respect to
each of these models?
II. INFORMED CONSENT: THE AUTONOMY MODEL

Casey's joint opinion recognized that the state may "ensure that [the
woman's] choice is thoughtful and informed."'" Within this informed consent model, three submodels may be identified: (1) a definition of informed
consent employed by the medical and tort systems, based on an understand-

"I Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
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ing of the choosing self that is limited to its immediate interests in bodily
well-being; (2) a model based on an enlarged vision of the self with various
life projects and critical interests, such as "behaving ethically," that a patient
may seek to further in her decisions; and (3) a state's paternalistic intervention into the decisional process to enhance the rational autonomy of the
patient.
A. Autonomy 1: The Self's Body

This narrow autonomy model largely governs medical decisionmaking
today through the doctrine of informed consent, which undergirds the law of
the doctor-patient relationship. The law has imposed upon physicians an
obligation to inform the voluntary patient about the nature of the proposed
procedure, reasonable alternative courses of treatment, and their relevant
risks and benefits to the body.52 In theory, the standard for judging the adequacy of the information given is whether the particular patient has the
information she needs to make an informed and intelligent decision about
treatment.53 Nevertheless, a majority of states require only that a physician
conform his degree of disclosure to the standard practice of the profession; a
minority of jurisdictions instead require providing information that a reasonable patient would want in assessing the procedure.54 As implemented by
the medical profession and enforced at law, the process at its core understands the self in terms of the body: in a narrowly self-interested and instrumentally rational way. Risks that entail the infliction of pain, loss of bodily

52

Richard E. Shagrue,

CREIGHTON

L.

REV.

The Practitioner's Guide to Informed Consent, 24

881, 903 (1991).

53 See id. at 902-05.
54 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, 336-39 (2d ed. 1991). The in-

formed consent model is sufficiently well-accepted that the Court impliedly recognized
the constitutional status of the interests it protects with respect to a person's autonomous choices regarding medical treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Typically, the extent of required disclosure is determined first by a physician's
judgment. This judgment is influenced by the standards of the profession, as expressed
in educational settings, journals, testimony of expert witnesses, professional associations, and the like. Next, the physician's judgment is shaped by the opportunity for the
patient to raise additional questions in a personal conversation with the physician. Finally, the physician's judgment is influenced by the feedback mechanism of the tort system
by which disgruntled patients who feel insufficiently informed sue, although such suits
in most cases only occur if the patient was physically or emotionally injured by the
procedure in addition to being insufficiently informed. See generally JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1986); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994); Marjorie M. Schultz, From Informed Consent to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); Bruce J. Winick,
On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1705 (1992).
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function, or death must be disclosed, as must benefits of reduced pain, increased bodily function, or extended life."
Because Roe provided that states could-and states do-restrict the
provision of lawful abortions to licensed physicians, the entire common law
corpus of informed consent doctrine became applicable to the abortion process. Three years after Roe, the Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth6
recognized the constitutional appropriateness of applying the common law of
informed consent to abortion services. The Court also permitted' states to
take the additional step of requiring that a physician evidence a woman's
informed consent with a signed form.57 After all, written informed consent
is often standard in medical practice.
Some Justices believed that a state might establish regulations particularly applicable to the consent process for abortion that would take into account the special manner in which abortion services are delivered. Fol-

" The duty to disclose information exists not only with respect to the physician's
proposed treatment, but also with respect to the full range of available treatments,
where a reasonable patient would consider further action warranted. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (Consol. 1987); Moore v. Preventive Medicine Medical Group,
Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 859 (Ct. App. 1986) (duty to disclose risk of not seeing specialist);
Schroder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981) (duty to disclose illness of child and
genetic risk of illness in future children); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979)
(duty to disclose availability of amniocentesis); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 555-59
(Okla. 1979) (duty to disclose treatment options and their attendant risks); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975) (duty to inform pregnant woman she
had rubella, which posed risk of birth defects); see also Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d
940, 943-46 (3d Cir. 1970); Phillips v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1 (D.S.C. 1981);
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975); Archer v. Galbraith, 567 P.2d 1155 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
56

428 U.S. 52 (1976).

5 Id. at 66-67. The Court held:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is
desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of
the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to
the extent of requiring her prior written consent.
Id. at 67.
The Court continued:
[W]e are content to accept, as the meaning [of informed consent], the giving of
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the attending physician
in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession.
Id. at 67 n.8; see also id. at 89, 90 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that a state may
enact a provision "aimed at ensuring that the abortion decision is made in a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary fashion").
58 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 443-44
(1983), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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lowing Roe, such services were not delivered as some Justices anticipated
they would be-by family physicians with long-standing relationships with
families.59 Rather, they were delivered by abortion clinics and family planning clinics that served women on an occasional basis.6" Some on the
Court feared that these were "abortion mills."61 The fear seems to be that
the physicians who work at such clinics have a financial interest that in
some never-specified way differ from the financial interests most physicians-or the corporations that now employ them-have in the services they
offer, and that such alleged differences uniquely interfere with the professional impartiality of the informed consent process respecting abortion.
Despite the concerns of some, following Danforth, the Court gave the states
little additional leeway in regulating the informed consent process of adult
women, other than through the common law tort of malpractice.62

S9

See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1973).

0 The Court itself had permitted this development in Doe by striking down regulations that abortions had to be performed in hospitals. Id. at 193-95. As a result, and
because of the lack of universal health care, it quickly became clear that the relationship
that Roe anticipated between doctor and patient did not exist for many, and that abortions would occur often in clinics in which physician-patient contact was not part of an
ongoing relationship.
61 See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulf, 428 U.S. 106, 130 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (referring to "an assembly-line type abortion clinic").
62 In Thornburgh and Akron, the Court struck down restrictive regulations of
the
informed consent process by rejecting: (1) a requirement of statements that it deemed to
be contrary to good medical treatment, as, for example, a requirement that a physician
always inform a patient that the state would seek to enforce child support from the father; (2) the use of false or unsupported statements about fetal development; and (3) the
state's effort to "wedge" its message-for example, that a fetus was a living human
being from the moment of conception-into the doctor-patient relationship. See
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 75965 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45. For
other informed consent provisions struck down prior to Casey, see, e.g., Charles v.
Daley, 749 F.2d 452, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 54 (1986);
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980) (striking down informed consent provisions requiring that certain information be provided at least 24 hours before the abortion, that the physician inform the pregnant woman of the possibility of pain to the
fetus, and that the attending physician conduct the informed consent consultation); Margaret S.v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980) (striking down informed consent
provision requiring physician to tell patients certain specific information regarding fetal
development, viability, emotional risks, birth control, and available social services).
The joint opinion in Casey asserted that it would overrule Thornburgh and Akron to
the extent they were inconsistent with its opinion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. Nevertheless,
the differences regarding informed consent between the Casey joint opinion and the
majority opinions in Akron and Thornburgh are not great. Casey's plurality opinion
protects only truthful information; Thornburgh and Akron found certain mandated statements under review to be false. Compare id. at 882 with Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763
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Evidence from the tort system does not disclose any significant complaints with this informed consent process as applied to the abortion procedure.63 There seem to be few tort suits involving informed consent. Various

and Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45. The Pennsylvania statute that was upheld in Casey
included a therapeutic privilege exception to mandated disclosures that was absent in
the laws struck down in Thornburgh and Akron, as the joint opinion noted. Casey, 505
U.S. at 883-84. Only the Casey joint opinion's willingness to allow the state to offer a
brochure to the patient, that is, to wedge a truthful message into the doctor-patient
relationship, departed from the non-wedging principle of Thornburgh and Akron.
' A search of the Westlaw Malpractice database (MMAL-CS) supports this assertion. A search on the word "abortion" on February 5, 1996 yielded 471 cases post-1969,
of which 315 involved malpractice actions pertinent to this inquiry (with the others
involving constitutional or other tangential issues). This absolute number of 315 cases is
small (and represents only 1.8% of the 17,538 post-1969 cases in the database). The
number is tiny in comparison with the approximately 25 million abortions performed
since 1969.
Of these 315 cases, at least 61% alleged physician malpractice not in performing
abortions but in interfering with a woman's reproductive liberty. This 61% consists of
the following three kinds of cases. First, 31% (of the 315 relevant cases) alleged that
misinformation from physicians (such as a failure to diagnose pregnancy or fetal injury
or defect) interfered with a woman's opportunity to make an informed choice in favor
of abortion. Another 24% involved "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy"
cases in which malpractice (such as a faulty sterilization) led to a pregnancy. An additional 6% involved malpractice in non-reproductive medical services that led to pregnancy complications resulting in the need for an abortion or a miscarriage.
Added to this 61% of cases is another 9% that complained not about receiving an
abortion but about the physician's failure to complete the abortion that was requested.
As a result, these patients allegedly suffered subsequent miscarriages, the passing of
fetal material without being warned of that possibility, a second, later-term abortion
with its greater emotional and physical impact, or an unintended birth.
Only the remaining 30% of the 315 cases alleged any harm from having a completed abortion. About 22% (of all the cases) alleged physical harm to the plaintiff from
a negligently performed abortion. At least some of these abortions may have been performed under adverse circumstances due to anti-abortion protests. The remaining 8%
involved cases in which the plaintiff alleged that providers failed to obtain the proper
informed consent for the abortion procedure. In many of these cases, the plaintiff lost.
In the two cases that clearly alleged a failure to disclose the emotional risks of abortion,
the plaintiffs lost. For cases among the 8% alleging lack of informed consent, in which
plaintiff lost, see, e.g., Abbey v. Jackson, 483 A.2d 330 (D.C. App. 1984); Reynier v.
Delta Woman's Clinic, 359 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 1978); Perez v. Park Madison Prof.
Labs., Inc., 630 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1995); Williams v. Long Island College Hosp., No.
9744/83, 1993 WL 247048 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). Plaintiffs did recover when the defendants failed to obtain a consent that would have been required for any surgical procedure. See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990) (plaintiff under influence of Demerol at time consent given); Cole v. Delaware League for Planned Parenthood, Inc., 530 A.2d 1119 (Del. 1987) (defendants failed to provide information regarding alternatives to abortion, and failed to provide proper drugs for post operative care);
Tisdale v. Pruitt, 394 S.E.2d 857 (S.C. App. 1990) (defendant performed an undesired
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abortion on the basis of a negligently formed and erroneous belief about services plaintiff required); Wright v. Germantown Hosp., No. 87/5362, 1992 WL 407652 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. 1992) (physician performed abortion against plaintiff's wishes and without informing her of effects of procedure); cf Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical
Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987) (permitting plaintiff to recover damages for emotional
distress after she was given incorrect information regarding the condition of her fetus
by genetics counselors and therefore chose to abort).
For the two cases that clearly presented a claim for failure to disclose emotional
risks of abortions, see Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990); Edison v. Reproductive Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1993). But cf Clement v. Riston, No.
B131,022, 1990 WL 466403 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1990) (Westlaw LRP jury database).
For a contrary view as to malpractice, see Paige C. Cunningham & Clarke D.
Forsythe, Is Abortion the "First Right" for Women?: Some Consequences of Legal
Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW 100, 132 (J. Douglas Butler & David
F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992).
Methodological Notes: Inferences about the existence and nature of a social problem must be drawn very carefully from reported decisions. Before a lawsuit is filed, a
claim must be named or understood as such; potential plaintiffs must have positive
social support for suing; attorneys must believe that it is in their economic interest to
sue, and the like. See William L.F. Felstiner, The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc. REV. 631 (1981). Once filed,
a lawsuit's outcome may be determined by a number of factors extraneous to the primary issues at stake. For example, in the malpractice area, rules limiting recovery for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury may reduce the number of cases attorneys bring. Cf Carolyn A. Goodzeit, Note, Rethinking Emotional Distress Law: PreNatal Malpractice and Feminist Theory, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 175 (1994). Finally, the
legal profession collects information about lawsuits in a haphazard manner: reported
appellate cases are seldom representative. (As "repeat players" in litigation, however,
abortion providers are likely to appeal adverse decisions, thus making their cases available as data). Furthermore, it might be that binding arbitration agreements preclude
potential plaintiffs from suing. Because induced abortions are usually not emergency
procedures, such agreements may have a greater chance of being upheld than in the
case of other medical services. As a general matter, however, courts often refuse to
enforce such contracts of adhesion. See Broemmer v. Abortion Servs., 840 P.2d 1013
(Ariz. 1992) (holding adhesion contract unenforceable as beyond patient's reasonable
expectations); Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985); Wheeler v. St.
Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting printed hospital forms as
creating adhesion contract); Curry v. Hillcrest Clinic, Inc., 638 A.2d 115 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994) (upholding right to de novo appeal from arbitration agreement).
To check the completeness of Westlaw's malpractice database, other searches were
performed on ALLCASES: Search 1: abortion & malpractice & "informed consent" %
"wrongful pregnancy" % "wrongful conception" % "wrongful life" % "wrongful
birth" % sterilization % vasectomy % spontaneous; Search 2: 115160 & "115III(A)2"
& abortion. This crosscheck disclosed nothing of substance omitted from the MMALCS database. A search of the Westlaw's FEDCASES database for the words malpractice and abortion disclosed 10 additional cases, which did not alter the percentages
reported above. A search of a jury verdict database, LRP-JV, for the words abortion
and malpractice and date(aft 1970) yielded 93 cases: 38 plaintiff verdicts, 44 defense
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reasons may account for this. One reason is the overall safety of abortion,
itself and when compared to childbirth.' As to efficacy, those who want an
abortion typically get what they request. Because abortion is a subject of
widespread debate, and childbearing capacity so central to their experience,
women are often well-informed about abortion before they arrive. Finally,
because the process of abortion counseling developed early on from the
women's movement,6 5 some clinics may engage in extensive counseling.
B. Autonomy 2: The Self's Critical Interests
It will be helpful, now, to enlist the aid of an imaginary Attorney General of Pennsylvania, who will develop a range of arguments in defense of the
state statute at issue in Casey. He might begin by objecting to this preceding benign conclusion about the informed consent process:
"This vision of informed consent is entirely too narrow
an understanding of a woman's own interests. She has interests in maintaining her self-esteem, in acting in a manner
consistent with her own self-conception, in furthering longrange generative goals, in behaving ethically, and, as a member of our community, in understanding how her behavior
relates to what others in society think about abortion.
"Accordingly, my state of Pennsylvania has prepared a
brochure with the following information: the extent of fetal
development by two-week increments, along with pictures of
the growing fetus; and the alternatives to abortion-childbirth and adoption-along with information about financial
resources for each, including paternal child support duties.66
"Because our goal is to foster the autonomy of the patient and not to foist our views upon her, we are requiring
only that the physician offer the pamphlet to her, and that
she indicate receipt in writing. We do not require her to read
the brochure or to listen to a verbal description of it, as have
some states. The information we require is far more limited
than what we might legitimately disclose: we do not review

verdicts, and 11 settlements, with 10 cases dealing with informed consent. A search of
Westlaw's Jury Verdict Database did not alter the general picture.
' See Abortion Trends, supra note 14, at 3235.
65

See LAURA

KAPLAN, THE STORY OF JANE: THE LEGENDARY

UNDERGROUND

FEMINIST ABORTION SERVICE (1995).

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (noting that the state may require "the giving of truth6
ful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health
risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus").
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the conflicting philosophical views about abortion-for example, that abortion is murder-nor do we require viewing
of the Silent Scream video.

"There are several clinicians, admittedly not in the mainstream, who support these disclosures and who consulted
with Surgeon General Koop during the Reagan Administration. They have described a post-abortion stress and a postabortion trauma disorder in which abortion precipitates major

depression, guilt, self-destructive behavior, and even psychosis.
"The informed consent process fails to inform pregnant
women of these psychological risks. More generally, many
pregnant women do not come to the decision with the experience, information, and independence of mind needed to
make an autonomous choice. In particular, adolescents are
woefully uninformed about fetal development and alternatives to abortion. These psychologists maintain that
women's ignorance makes them especially vulnerable to
being pressured by their boyfriends,67 their culture, and
poverty into consenting to an abortion. Ignorant of the facts
and vulnerable to coercion, these women's autonomy is compromised. When and if some women who have aborted subsequently learn more, especially about the fetus,6" the abortion can come to have traumatic consequences. She must be
warned of that possibility now.69

67

Interestingly, the psychologists and groups that claim that abortion causes psycho-

logical trauma cite the evidence of domestic abuse that the Casey plurality used in deciding not to mandate spousal notice. See id. at 892 (citing Barbara Ryan & Eric
Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 44 (1989)). These psychologists treat this evidence
as describing typical instances of male-female relationships. They then argue that a regime of legal abortion leaves women highly vulnerable to coercion and exploitation by
men who will overwhelm the autonomous reproductive choices of women.
Perhaps an aborting woman may thereafter come to hold different beliefs, and
then reevaluate her decision to have had an abortion, retrospectively reaching a different
conclusion. For example, she may come to believe that a fetus is a person, or she may
become disappointed that she has not had the child she anticipated eventually having at
the time she had the abortion. At this later point, she may nonetheless accept her earlier
choice as valid when made, or she may regret her choice if she believes that her earlier
decisionmaking process was flawed.
Of course, a woman at the time of her abortion decision may believe that the fetus
is a person, but that abortion is the best choice under her circumstances. Men have
reasoned in a similar fashion about preserving a way of life that is good for them
through war and about declining to help those in need of life-sustaining aid.
69 Accordingly, Casey noted:
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"Such clinicians explain that mainstream psychology
systematically understates the sequelae of abortion in two
ways: the depth of the impact on those women who suffer it,
and the number of women who suffer from some form of
distress.7" We can account for this by academic
psychology's typical overreliance on surface data from selfreports on psychological instruments, and by its ideological
support for abortion rights. I would add, as a third reason,
the psychological denial identified, for example, by Judith
Herman in her book Trauma and Recovery: no one wants to
listen to a person's trauma, and few will, unless a political
movement of enfranchisement supports it.71
"The law can take an active role in trying to correct and
enlarge the medical profession's understanding of the patient,
including her need for additional forms of information.
Moreover, the law can protect a specific subclass of patients
who are presently ill-served by medical understanding. It
may do so through specific regulations designed to assist the
woman's decision making process, rather than relying on the
after-the-fact, and less predictable, process of jury
decisionmaking in tort malpractice actions."
What response may be made to these
Pennsylvania's informed consent provisions?

arguments

defending

1. A Departurefrom Medical Practice
This enlarged vision of the patient's interests does not represent medical-legal standard practice and therefore requires careful consideration to
determine whether women are being singled out for differential treatment,
and a treatment that, although it purports to be, is not in their interest. For

It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health .... In
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend [sic] the full consequences of her
decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
'" See Medical and Psychological Impact of Abortion: Hearing Before the Human
Resources and IntergovernmentalRelations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Hearing]; id. at 120-29
(statement of Anne Speckhard, Ph.D.); id. at 127 (labelling as "conjecture" Vincent
Rue's prediction that 15-45% of women who have undergone abortions will develop
negative sequelae, based on Rue's review of 88 studies).
71 JuDITH

L.

HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY

32 (1992).
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example, the moral appropriateness of a particular medical procedure is
normally assumed to be outside the proper range of physician disclosures.
One doesn't hear of discussions with a patient concerning whether his upcoming surgery could better serve a different patient or whether a scarce
organ transplant would increase social utility if given to another. The costs
of participation in an excessively narcissistic culture are presumably not
mentioned to the patient seeking a silicone implant or liposuction. The need
of long-term foster care children for adoption is not brought to the attention
of patients considering in vitro fertilization-and certainly not to the attention of the woman who opts for childbirth in lieu of abortion cum adoption.
Nor under case law need a physician attend to a patient's critical interests in
completing his life's projects. For example, the California Supreme Court
recently held that a physician's duties are limited to "protect[ing] the
patient's freedom to 'exercise ... control over [one's] own body' by directing the course of medical treatment."72 Accordingly, the court rejected
a malpractice claim that the physician's failure to disclose statistical cancer
survival rates prevented the patient from ordering his affairs before death."
Only a narrow, bodily centered understanding of the patient's interests governed.
2. A Lack of EmpiricalEvidence
If there were strong empirical evidence that the informed consent process as
practiced by physicians is failing to protect patients-in this instance, those who
suffer a post-abortion trauma-the legislature could compel a departure from
this standard medical practice. The empirical data on which Pennsylvania
purports to act is flawed, however. The dominant psychological view, embodied
in the work of Professor Nancy E. Adler, and the American Psychological
Association's position paper, is that abortion has few negative sequelae.74
' See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608 (Cal. 1993) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972)).
Id. at 608-09.
' Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1194 (1992) [hereinafter Adler et al., Psychological Factors]; Nancy E.
Adler et al., PsychologicalResponses After Abortion, SCIENCE, Apr. 6, 1990, at 41; see
also Susan J. Blumenthal, PsychiatricConsequences ofAbortion: Overview of Research
7

Findings, in PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF ABORTION 17 (Nada L. Stotland ed., 1991);
Warren B. Miller, An Empirical Study of the Psychological Antecedents and
Consequences of Induced Abortion, J.Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 67; Nancy F. Russo,
PsychologicalAspects of Unwanted Pregnancy and Its Resolution, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw 593 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992);
Abortion Trends, supra note 14; Paul K.B. Dagg, The PsychologicalSequelae of Therapeutic Abortion-Denied and Completed, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 578 (1991); D.R.
Urquhart & A.A. Templeton, Psychiatric Morbidity and Acceptability Following
Medical and Surgical Methods of Induced Abortion, 98 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
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According to this view, the dominant post-abortion affect is relief, in marked
contrast to pre-abortion anxiety related to the unwanted pregnancy. For those
who experience guilt and sadness, these feelings tend to abate within a few
months. The recurrence in some of sadness on anniversaries of the abortion is
not an injury, but a normal psychological process, which may abate, especially
with subsequent childbirth. If the more serious sequelae that our imaginary
Attorney General describes were to exist, they would surely have shown up
somewhere in the health care system, inasmuch as abortion is one of the most
frequently performed surgical procedures in the country-more than 25 million
in the United States since Roe, with, by some estimates, nearly one-fifth of
American women having had an abortion.75 Nor does evidence from the tort
system support the view that the sequelae are very prevalent or serious.

COLOGY 396 (1991). See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 212-18 nn.124-28;
Symposium, PsychologicalPerspectives on Abortion and Its Alternatives: Research and
Policy, J. SOC. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 1; Gregory H. Wilmoth et al., Prevalence of
Psychological Risks Following Legal Abortion in the U.S.: Limits of the Evidence, J.
Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 37.
For the contrary view, see Brief Amici Curiae of Focus on the Family, and Family
Research Council of America in Support of Appellants, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN:
SILENT No MORE (1987); Vincent M. Rue & Anne C. Speckhard, Counseling Informed
Consent & Abortion: Issues in Medicine & Counseling, 6 MED. & MIND 75 (1991);
Anne C. Speckhard & Vincent Rue, Complicated Mourning: Dynamics of Impacted
Post Abortion Grief, PRE- & PERINATAL PSYCHOL. J., Fall 1993, at 5; Anne Speckhard
& Vincent M. Rue, Postabortion Syndrome: An Emerging Public Health Concern, J.
Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 95. See also Dennis A. Bagarozzi, Identification, Assessment
and Treatment of Women Suffering from Post Traumatic Stress After Abortion, J. FAM.
PSYCHOTHERAPY, Issue 3, at 25 (1994). But cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F.
Supp. 1323, 1333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding Rue's testimony not credible), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768 (D. Minn. 1986) (finding
Rue's testimony less convincing than other expert testimony), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th
Cir. 1988), affd, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
For discussions of the abortion counseling process in the legal literature, see Susan
F. Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the
Physician'sRole in "Private" Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183 (1985);
Susan F. Appleton, More Thoughts on the Physician's ConstitutionalRole in Abortion
and Related Choices, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 499 (1988); Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of
Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51 (1983); Thomas L. Jipping, Informed
Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 329 (1988); Susan 0.
Renfer et al., The Woman's Right to Know; A Model Approach to the Informed Consent
of Abortion, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 409 (1991); Terry N. Steinberg, Note, Abortion
Counseling: To Benefit Maternal Health, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 483 (1989); Joseph W.
Stuart, Abortion and Informed Consent: A Cause of Action, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1
(1987).
" See Fawn Vrazo, Warriors in a Cause, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 26, 1992, at Al.
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Surprisingly few women who self-identify as victims of abortion have sued on
the grounds that a physician failed to disclose the moral risks that might follow
their abortions-risks of harms, which they have claimed in marches, speakouts, and briefs to the Supreme Court, ruined their lives.76
Toward the end of the Reagan Administration, the office of Surgeon
General Koop undertook a project to demonstrate that the sequelae of abortion
were far more negative than the predominant assessment suggested.' Nevertheless, as his staff developed the project, partly in consultation with psychologists who asserted the existence of serious post-abortion effects, it became clear
to the scrupulous Dr. Koop that the report simply could not be issued.78 The
prevailing scientific consensus was too strongly against the project's intended
message, and the scientific evidence of an abortion trauma syndrome was nonexistent, ambiguous, or limited to too few persons to merit a public health
response.' Accordingly, the anti-choice Koop desisted. Unable to prevail with
Koop when its proponents held power, the prospects for the abortion-trauma
position becoming accepted as "common knowledge" are, and should be,
severely in doubt.
3. A Less Burdensome Means
Even if empirical evidence were found to support state regulation, a less
burdensome and more effective regulatory alternative exists than the Attorney General's proposed disclosure requirements for warning of these alleged
moral risks. The mainstream psychological literature reveals that a limited
number of women may experience certain psychological difficulties, some
serious, with abortion."0 Our Attorney General might urge that the informed
consent process should warn all women of specific psychological risk
groups. Yet a woman subjected to a long list of disclosures about the psy-

76

77
78

See generally REARDON, supra note 74.
See supra note 70.
Hearing, supra note 70, at 194.

9 See Hearing,supra note 70, at 194-200; HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN DETERMINING THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMH.R. REP. No. 392, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1989).
' These may be divided into the following groups: (1) those aborting a wanted
pregnancy, as a result of fetal injury or malformation, the loss of the father through his
death or his rejection of the pregnancy or the relationship, or some other life reversal;
(2) those who feel very ambivalent about or coerced into having an abortion; (3) those
who believe or are influenced by others who believe that abortion is murder or otherwise wrong; (4) those who have other serious psychological problems, possibly related
to earlier trauma; and (5) those who would also be susceptible to postpartum depression, possibly as a result of the abrupt reduction in hormone levels following any pregnancy outcome. See materials cited in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 212-18 nn.124-28;
PACT OF ABORTION ON WOMEN,

Brenda Major & Catherine Cozzarelli, PsychosocialPredictors to Adjustment to Abortion, J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 121; supra note 74.
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chological risks of abortion that some face might feel not that her autonomy
is being respected, but that she is being scared off. Furthermore, such warnings can only increase knowledge if they are combined with warnings about
the psychological risks of giving children away in adoption,81 of having an
unwanted child, of being a single mother, or of living with an abusive husband, not to mention the specific risks of pregnancy and childbirth. The
effectiveness of such numerous and conflicting warnings in assisting a woman in her decision is doubtful, as so many warnings quickly can become
unintelligible.
An alternative to this long list of risks exists: there are markers that
permit many of these at-risk women to be identified during the process of
informed consent and abortion counseling; and, once identified, these women may be further counseled. Helpful markers include prior psychiatric difficulties or ambivalence about the abortion-whether that ambivalence reflects
religious scruples, an initially wanted pregnancy, present coercion from

" Among women who have placed children for adoption, a small number have
made claims remarkably similar to women who claim to have been harmed by abortion.
Such women assert that they were coerced into placing a child for adoption; that they
were thereby exploited by selfish professional and lay persons; that adoption violates
the natural order and the nature of motherhood; and that they have been traumatized
with unremitting self-recrimination, guilt, and interference with personal and work relationships. Having experienced trauma and exploitation, some of these women seek to
increase the legal regulation of adoption, restrict adoption practices, or end adoption
altogether. For one source on this little-studied subject, see Tom Junod, Someone Else's
Child, GENTLEMAN'S Q., Dec. 1994, at 258 (discussing Concerned United Birthparents);
see also Sandra Evans, Regrets and Memories, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1994, at Z13;
Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1993, at 56;
Beth Seader, Do Young UnmarriedFathers Have Rights, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 1993,
at 13A. Such claims are also outside the mainstream of current psychological research.
For psychological studies of the psychological impact of adoption on birth parents,
see, e.g., JULIA TUGENDHAT, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: SEARCHING AND UNITING
(1992); Linda F. Cushman et al., Placing an Infant for Adoption: The Experiences of
Young Birthmothers, 38 Soc. WORK 264 (1993); Eva Y. Deykin et al., Fathers of
Adopted Children:A Study of the Impact of Child Surrender on Birthfathers, 58 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 240 (1988); John E. Gedo, UnmarriedMotherhood:A Paradigmatic
Single Case Study, 46 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 352 (1965); Debra Kalmuss et al.,
Short-Term Consequences of Parenting Versus Adoption Among Young Unmarried
Women, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 80 (1992); Edward K. Rynearson, Relinquishment
and Its Maternal Complications: A Preliminary Study, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 338
(1982); Paul Sachdev, Achieving Openness in Adoption: Some CriticalIssues in Policy
Formulation,61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 241 (1991).
The similarity between claims of women identifying both abortion and adoption as
traumatic suggests that procreation may be a psychologically risky, highly meaningful
activity in which one involves oneself (or refrains from involving oneself) at one's
peril. At least this is the case for those who are especially "vulnerable" to procreative
experiences.
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parent or boyfriend, or inner longings. The search for ambivalence allows
the counselor to identify those women who are themselves conflicted when
it is not possible for the counselor to anticipate a priori just what critical
interests unique to each woman might need to be addressed. Furthermore,
such counseling responds to each woman's emotional needs for communication and deliberation in a way that a legislatively prescribed listing of additional risks cannot. The effectiveness of such inquiry is supported by some
empirical evidence that the informed consent process is more effective when
the physician is charged with implementing the principle of patient autonomy, rather than simply with disclosing a prescribed list of facts.8 2
Together, these arguments against a mandatory disclosure of "moral"
risks and social facts certainly justify a policy favoring the traditional disclosures made in the first, narrower model of informed consent. Nevertheless,
given the claims of some women's suffering, such arguments did not persuade the Justices of the Casey plurality to find that Pennsylvania's information requirements were either irrational, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome,
and therefore unconstitutional." Indeed, the current Justices of the plurality
might have found such arguments insufficient even under Roe's trimester
scheme in establishing unconstitutionality. A state under Casey can presumably conclude that the informed consent process as practiced has failed a
subgroup of women and that the difficulty of identifying which patients belong to this subgroup warrants additional mandated advice to all.
4. An Imposition on a Woman's Self-Conception

Our Attorney General continues more boldly:
"Pennsylvania may even alter the usual informed consent
practices of the medical profession without adducing any
empirical evidence showing that its practices cause diagnosable emotional harm, fail a large group of patients, or are
otherwise in need of reform. So long as it does not act arbitrarily, the state may impose an informed consent process
that takes into account the state's enlarged understanding of
the patient's self and her interests, 8 by disclosing facts and

82

See

CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAK-

324 (1984).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885, 887, 899 (1992).

ING IN PSYCHIATRY
83

4 The Attorney General may here point out various ways in which state regulation
affects the medical profession's conception of the patient. The law has, in effect, mandated a new diagnosis of child abuse so that the child's long-term relationships, rather
than immediate physical condition, define the medical problem. See Landeros v. Flood,
551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976). Proposals that physicians query women patients about
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ideas that the state believes would be considered by a rational woman."85
Some would respond as follows: If the information provided is not in
fact in the patient's self-interest as she understands it, mandating disclosure
of that information cannot be justified under the informed consent model.'
They might even argue that the best way to respect patient autonomy and to
avoid a mismatch between mandated disclosures and a woman's self-conception is to refocus informed consent entirely back on the core interest of
bodily well-being. After all, it is the physician's technical expertise, and the
resulting disparity in power between physician and patient, that justify the
disclosure and consent process. Wider concerns of the patient's self are

spousal abuse, especially during pregnancy, might also implement a salutary change that
compels the physician to expand his understanding of the patient's interests. Finally, by
mandating family practitioners as gatekeepers to special services, health care reform
may reduce the fragmentation of the "person" of the patient that comes from increasing
medical subspecialization. The Attorney General also might note that states have required medical counseling prior to allowing an adoption or divorce.
" As the joint opinion in Casey states:
Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the
impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision....
We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a
woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her
health.... [I]nformed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all
considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
The Casey joint opinion remains ambiguous as to whether such disclosures are
justified by a concern for the woman's autonomy or the state's interest in protecting the
fetus (which implicates the government speech but not the informed consent rationale).
Thus the opinion adds:
[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion. In short, requiring that the woman be informed of the availability
of information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should
she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to insure
an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion.
id. at 883.
86 This point is to be distinguished from the fact that in any system of informed
consent, there will not be a perfect fit between the mandated disclosure and the particular requirements of the patient. Some patients will be provided with more than they
want, and others with less. Nevertheless, such minor departures from an ideal model of
informed consent are not paternalistic interventions but the result of the imprecision that
accompanies any legal regulation.

822

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:3

outside of the physician's technical competence. At a minimum, they would
restrict an enlarged set of disclosures to those women for whom this information is relevant to their expressed interests. Implementing such a restriction, however, would be difficult. An individual physician in an ongoing
relationship with a patient may be in a position to understand her and how
she defines her interests. With an enlarged appreciation of the possible range
of his patient's critical interests, he may choose to provide information that
he reasonably believes may enhance her autonomous choice. In practice,
clinics regularly lack particular information about a patient's self-conception.
Applying a mandated, enlarged definition of the self that presupposes a
particular range of critical interests, a clinic physician risks projecting upon
the patient reasons that are not reasons for her, and information that is not
pertinent to her interests, as she conceives them. This she may well experience as invasive. 87
In response, our Attorney General would answer:
"Surely this position admits too narrow a range of what
we may safely say to each other and unnecessarily limits the
physician-patient dialogue. The woman remains in control of
deciding whether to have an abortion, and therefore of what
count as good reasons for her. But the law need not protect
her self-conception from inquiry about what the scope of her
interests might be. Given the unique nature of abortion and
the circumstances under which pregnant women must decide,
it is no impermissible burden on pregnant women for the
state to stretch medicine's conception of the patient's self
solely in the context of abortion services."
Legal objection to such an expansion of the informed consent process
cannot successfully be grounded in the philosophical claim that moral reasons are not external to the person and that only the decisionmaker can
know her reasons.88 Nor can it be grounded in the view that simply equates
autonomy with liberty and non-coercion, and denies to the state any interest
in fostering autonomy. Nor would a patient's assertion that she experiences
the giving of information itself as invasive 9 suffice to narrow the informed

87

Justice Blackmun citedi as an example of such invasive practices, compelled dis-

closure to a rape victim of information that the state would try to require the father to
make child support payments if she gave birth. See Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986), overruled in part by Casey,
505 U.S. at 833.
See generally Connie S. Rosati, Internalism and the Good for a Person, 106 ETH-

iCs 297 (1996).
89

A physician cannot claim a therapeutic privilege against disclosure of risks to
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consent process and defeat legislative support for autonomous choice. Rather, objection to the Attorney General's position should be grounded in the
practical difficulties that would arise if the state were to embark upon a
rigorous program of autonomy-enhancement for adults, based on a mere
assertion of what a "rational woman" needs to consider. The Attorney
General's position edges far down the slippery slope of paternalistic re-education. A philosopher may develop a standard rigorous in its demands regarding individual cognitive and emotional capacity and rationality, and in
its range of reasons that the autonomous person should consider. Such a
philosopher would no doubt seek to persuade others in non-coercive conversation as to the correctness of the standard. By contrast, if the state were to
undertake such a program, it would risk excluding many women from exercising meaningful choice, and thus interfere with the liberty of women who
have decided to have an abortion.9" That no such program for adults is
found in our law is suggestive of how paternalistically coercive and inconsistent with our liberal practices it would be. This difficulty is exacerbated
by the divisive nature of the abortion controversy; it may well be impossible
at this juncture for the state to develop a detailed brochure or other communication with a very full set of disclosures while retaining sufficient factual
and emotive neutrality so as plausibly to be seen as enhancing autonomy.
Departure from such neutrality also poses an emotional risk. Informing a
patient that people differ in their attitudes towards abortion and that a
patient's response to her abortion may be influenced by her own attitudes,
by how others react, and by what she has been taught, is quite different
from a mandated statement conveying opposition to abortion. The latter may
have its own harmful consequences. Indeed, the evidence shows that a
woman's psychological reactions to her abortion may be affected by the
attitudes of those around her; the negative attitudes of others can cause psychological difficulties.91 Such an iatrogenic warning cannot be justified by

spare a patient simple discomfort that is not injurious to health, but he can use his
knowledge of the patient's critical interests to determine whether to withhold information. Thus, for example, a physician may be justified in not disclosing a patient's terminal condition when a patient has indicated that he prefers not to know: that is, the
patient's critical interests include neither self-knowledge nor a sense of obligation to
disclose to others. Similarly, a physician's duty to advise an HIV patient to warn others
of his status when that patient has made clear that he feels no such moral duty would
arise (to the extent it does) not from the physician's obligation to his patient but to
others at risk. Cf Chizman v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995) (permitting patient
to recover emotional damages resulting from physician's disclosure of AIDS test results).
' See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection,
and Feminist Jurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1251-54 (1992).
91 See Adler et al., Psychological Factors, supra note 74, at 1200-01.
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an appeal to the woman's own interests in making an informed medical

choice.
To minimize these risks, a reviewing court should adopt an "autonomyin-fact" standard that requires the state to justify empirically what it would
disclose to women for their own good. The standard should require evidence
that a fair number of women actually want and would use the truthful 92
information that the state would require physicians to provide. The articulated needs of real women check the state's imaginary autonomous patient. To
avoid coercion, moreover, the process of providing the information must
respect the woman's choice to decline to consider information on subjects
that fall outside the scope of her own definition of self-interest.9"
This "autonomy-in-fact" standard would not silence the state. In close
cases, the state simply would be required to acknowledge that it speaks not
for the woman, but in pursuit of its own interests. Such acknowledgement
would enhance the accountability of public officials who favor such speech
by making them "own" the message, and prevent them, so to speak, from
hiding behind the skirts of women. Other principles, discussed in Part IV, of
government speech would then govern.
C. PaternalisticIntervention to Enhance the Decisionmaking Process

Our imagined Pennsylvania Attorney General has more to say:
"We do not here presume to force our views on an unwilling woman, a subject that I will discuss later when I
address government speech.
"But it is not out of bounds for the state to intervene
paternalistically in the decisionmaking process, to a brief and

9 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (noting that "[ilf the
information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not
misleading, the requirement may be permissible").
9' Since Casey, several consent provisions similar to Pennsylvania's have been upheld, but solely in facial challenges, without the empirical evidence that should be adduced in an as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18
F.3d 526, 530 (8th Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409, 1418
(D.S.D. 1994), aff'd, 63 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995); Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v.
Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1491 (D. Utah 1994), rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 75
F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993). Three of the statutes reviewed in these cases-from South Dakota, Mississippi and Ohio-lacked a provision recognizing a therapeutic privilege so as to permit
physicians to omit state-mandated disclosures in appropriate cases. See Barnes, 970
F.2d at 14; Miller, 860 F. Supp. at 1420; Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d at 591. Such an omission should have made these statutes vulnerable to an as-applied challenge.
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limited degree, to enhance rather than derogate from the
woman's ultimate autonomy in making her abortion choice.
A woman's interest in structuring her decisionmaking process-in acting impulsively or ignorantly for example-is far
less significant than her interest in making her abortion
choice itself, and may not be consistent with the assumptions
of rational autonomy.94
"The state of Pennsylvania therefore requires a twentyfour hour waiting period after the mandated information is
provided. Although some states permit such information to
be given over the phone, and thus do not mandate more than
one trip to the clinic, we think that the process will be more
effective if conducted in person. It is a rare non-emergency
operation, whether vasectomy, in vitro fertilization, sexchange, autologous bone marrow transplant, kidney donation,
or elective plastic surgery, that does not de facto involve a
waiting period. "Health reform" will only aggravate the
problem. The state already claims to protect the woman by
providing for a long waiting period in which she can withdraw her consent to an adoption, and may protect her by
providing long waiting periods before a no-fault divorce
becomes final.95 Similarly, we are beginning to limit violence by imposing waiting periods on the purchase of guns.
"Contrary to Justice Stevens's suggestion, it is no slur on
or outmoded view of women to take seriously the stressful
circumstances in which women find themselves when pregnant.' Patients who suffer post-traumatic distress might
The philosophical literature refers to such interventions as cases of weak paternalism, in that the intervention enhances autonomy by intervening to forestall a non-autonomous act-here one presumed to be ignorant, impulsive, unconsidered, and anxietydriven. In such cases, interventions may be consistent with a fundamental commitment
to autonomy. See JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN
HEALTH CARE 111 (1982) (noting that "'Soft' paternalism warrants actions only when

the patient's own values are threatened"); id. at 114 (observing that "[tiemporary interventions, designed to determine the patient's capacity to make decisions and to ascertain
the probability and magnitude of harm, are often justified when long-term interventions
would not be"). See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed. 1994); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1986); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1984); JOHN KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND
INTERVENTION: PATERNALISM IN THE CARING LIFE (1995); DONALD VAN DEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE (1986); Joel
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 105 (1971).
See GLENDON, supra note 13, at 107.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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well have benefitted from an increased period of reflection.
Although abortion clinics sometimes delay abortion procedures and recommend further reflection on the part of their
patients, the legislature need not put its trust in a particular
counselor, given the stakes."97
It is the 24-hour waiting period that shows the real difference between
Roe and the undue burden standard of Casey's joint opinion. In Akron, the
Court had struck down a similar waiting period because it did not further-it harmed-the state's interest in a woman's health, which was the
primary interest it could legitimately assert prior to viability.98 By contrast,
using the undue burden standard and asserting that the state has a substantial

interest in potential life and the woman's autonomy, the Casey joint opinion
upheld a 24-hour waiting period.99

Casey involved a facial challenge to the Pennsylvania abortion statute,
which was enjoined before its impact was known."° But a regulation may
be a substantial obstacle by virtue of not only its intent but also its effect on
women's choice and Casey guarantees that a woman's choice must be "effective" and not merely a formal right.' Accordingly, the joint opinion
indicated that in a subsequent suit a party may show that, as it actually
operates in a locale, a 24-hour waiting period"°2 constitutes a substantial
obstacle to some group of women.0 3

7 The joint opinion in Casey found: "[t]he idea that important decisions will be
more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection ... [is] not ...
unreasonable," especially given the additional information the state offers the woman.

Id. at 885.
" City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 450 (1983),
overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
99 Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
100 Id. at 845.
10 Id. at 878.
102 Surely any period beyond 24 hours for adult women should be treated as an undue burden. Because there is no duty to consult with others, see Pennsylvania statute
discussed supra note 15, this longer waiting period would serve no informed consent
purpose in facilitating the assimilation of information.
103 Such classes might include AFDC women, poor working women, rural women
living several hours from the only abortion provider, and women going to clinics besieged by protesters who invade the privacy of patients. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 886.
North and South Dakota, where a second visit requirement might well be held to be

an undue burden because of the scarcity of abortion providers, permit the commencement of the waiting period to be triggered by a phone call in which a physician's agent
provides information, including gestational age based on the date of the woman's last
menstruation. This necessitates only one visit to the physician, for the certification of
informed consent and the abortion itself. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer,
18 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding on its face a statute similar to the Pennsyl-
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In such subsequent litigation, plaintiff's proof of the material difficulties
imposed by a waiting period and its unfair distributional consequences will
be easy enough. While Pennsylvania has substantial urban centers, it must
be remembered that outside our nation's major cities, abortion services simply are unavailable or only intermittently available."° Expenses mount rapidly from a second doctor visit, lost employment, distant travel, overnight
lodging, and babysitting. For many, such costs are profound. Moreover,
even a one-day waiting period readily results in a delay of a week or more
between initial appointment and the surgery, because clinics may not perform abortions daily and because the delivery of abortion services is so
maldistributed geographically." The medical data are clear that such delay denies women abortions that are physically safer and less distressing
emotionally, for morbidity and distress increase with each week's delay."
Also, for many, the earlier an abortion is performed, the less ethically problematic it is. Finally, two visits have substantial implications for a woman's
interest in privacy. It is this privacy that can shield her from the coercion of
anti-abortion groups at the clinic and from the physical abuse or emotional
coercion of husbands, family, or friends,"° as the joint opinion so clearly
recognized." As they did in cases involving African-Americans' civil
rights, courts should take into account the impact of privately organized

vania statute reviewed in Casey); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409,
1420-21 (D.S.D. 1994) (upholding informed consent provision requiring certain information be provided to the patient 24 hours before the abortion either in person or by
telephone), aff'd, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v.
Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1487-91 (D. Utah 1994) (noting that the magistrate judge
interpreted Utah's statute as allowing telephonic communication, and that plaintiffs did
not object to such interpretation, but further noting that such an interpretation is not
necessary for the law to be constitutional because two visits can be required under
Casey), rev'd in part and dismissed in part, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995). Some Pennsylvania clinics have tried this same telephonic procedure but the state has opposed the
attempts. See Kimberly L. Jackson, Ridge Tightens Abortion Counseling; Rules Taped
Messages on Phone Might Bring License Revocation, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
May 24, 1995, at A3; Fawn Vrazo, Abortion Clinics' Use of Phone Tapes Probed,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 23, 1994, at B3; Fawn Vrazo, Clinics Find Way to Ease
Abortion Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 23, 1994, at Al.
""oAbortion Trends, supra note 14, at 3238.
05 Id. at 3237.
106 See id. at 3231-39;

see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323,

1.344 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affid in
part,rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'"

See A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434,

1453 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Fawn Vrazo, A Preview of Limited Abortion, PHIL. INQUIRER,
Sept. 14, 1992, at Al.
1"8 Casey, 505 U.S. at 888, 893, 899.
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violence and other lesser forms of coercion in assessing whether pregnant
women can effectively exercise their rights.
This much was known to the Court in Casey. What should be especially
troublesome-indeed determinative-about the Attorney General's argument
for paternalism is the absence of any data to support his claim that a delay
confers a benefit on the decisionmaking process of any identifiable group of
women. 19 Unless such data are available, the justification for a waiting
period is altogether absent. ' Many women seem to come to clinics with
their decision already made, after careful, extended consideration of the
procedure."' State intervention thus imposes heightened anxiety, cost, and
physical risk without assisting in the decisionmaking process: it is mere
interference. For those who decline to receive the state's message, the delay
caused by a forced second visit is completely irrational. As noted in the last
section, a more narrowly tailored rule, mandating delay for women who are
identified during the informed consent process as being unsure or ambiva-

109
1"0

Id. at 920-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A comparison with the very different and weak-paternalistic decisionmaking pro-

cedures in right-to-die cases is useful. For example, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), upheld the state's rules structuring a decisionmaking process that made removing life support difficult. Essential to the Court's decision upholding the restrictive state rule was the empirical difficulty in ascertaining the comatose
patient's present choices. Id. at 280. Here by contrast, empirical evidence is available or

can be ascertained regarding women in general and each patient's expressed interests.
Oregon has recently adopted a right-to-die initiative for patients with less than six
months to live which provides for the involvement of two physicians, three successive
requests to die by the patient, and a 15-day waiting period. Oregon Death with Dignity
Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.827 (1995). The second physician requirement serves
to verify the physician's estimate that the patient has only six months to live, thereby
enhancing patient autonomy by augmenting the reliability of the medical prediction
upon which he acts.

The euthanasia mandated delay is distinguishable in several ways from the 24-hour
waiting period for abortion. First, because assisted-suicide is a new societal phenomenon, little data on physician-assisted suicide is available for judging how to implement
patient autonomy. Accordingly, judicial deference to a state's exploratory technique is
justified. By contrast, we have the experience of over 25 million abortions since 1973
upon which to base our practices. See Vrazo, supra note 75, at Al. Second, there is a
theoretical and empirical basis for finding a link among a patient's terminal illness, his
depression, and his wish to die that warrants mandating some delay until further investigations can clarify the relationship. Third, delay in abortion increases the physical and
emotional risks to the woman as well as jeopardizes her privacy interests in maintaining
her non-maternal social status. By contrast, delay in suicide for a terminally-ill patient-although possibly requiring the endurance of pain--does not increase risks to
health or informational privacy in the same way.
.. Abortion Trends, supra note 14, at 3237, 3241; see also A Woman's Choice, 904
F. Supp. at 1450; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 212 n.124.
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lent about their choice, might better respond to the clinical data that our
Attorney General puts forward.
Perhaps what troubles Pennsylvania is precisely the fact that many women exercise their autonomy before arriving at the clinic-that is, in private.
What galls is that these women act independently, without involvement,
outside of a state-sponsored dialogical community.
III. THE DIALOGICAL MODEL

A. The Attorney General's Complaint

Our Attorney General continues in a very different manner:
"My opponents' understanding is consistently too shallow. We have already seen that they depict an autonomous
self whose range of interests is quite narrow. In their constricted view, any additional facts that the woman might
want to consider in reaching her abortion decision would be
idiosyncratic preferences about which she may inquire, but
which neither the law nor the profession of medicine should
anticipate.
"But they suffer from a deeper error. All their talk of
individual autonomy, narrow or broad, is legal idealism; your
autonomous subject is a legal fiction. People exist only in
communities and in relationships, many of them not of their
own choosing. Yet Roe allows the woman to wall herself off
from any community and in total isolation make a lifechanging choice, with substantial ramifications for herself
and others. The state should be able to take into account
what we believe about citizens in general, or at least about
citizens in our community here, and seek to establish a process through which the woman can educate herself about her
fuller social identity as a generative being. For it is as generative beings that adults become themselves in our community.
"Furthermore, certain critical events in human development-the onset of puberty, marriage, the birth of a child,
the death of a family member-are not atomistic events.
They are social in nature. Each culture makes something of
them; as it makes something of them, people are made, and
in turn make something of themselves. We as a society fail
our members when we collectively allow social meanings to
disintegrate and our collective social involvement in these
events to wane.
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"The state's role in this matter is all the more critical
because we live in a time of impoverished language. The
attempt to develop a lingua franca to ease communication
among many different cultures, between the two sexes,
across classes, and among different age groups, in the end
has only sterilized our language and removed from it its rich
moral tradition in response to various claims that it had
merely represented a hegemonic discourse. As a result, much
of our current speech facilitates communication only on the
most narcissistic and consumption-oriented terms set by the
mass media, especially television. The state need not accede
to this. Although in a regime of free speech it may not regulate language, the state can make available dialogical settings
that afford a communicative opportunity with persons who
may employ a language more adequate to the task of deciding about abortion.
"In our Anglo-American legal tradition, a woman's autonomy remains the standard. But the state has a role in
structuring a dialogical process of decision so that in the
course of choosing, a pregnant woman engages with those
relevant members of the community who can enhance the
meaningfulness of her decision and help her reflect upon her
identity, rooted as it is in relationship to them."
An attorney general who spoke this way would cause quite a stir by
departing from the law's individualistic presumptions that regularly disregard the actual psychological and social circumstances of decisionmakers.
To explore this less-charted terrain, we need to identify a dialogical model
of decisionmaking, indeed two such models: one weaker and the other stronger.
The weaker model is little different from our previously discussed model
of paternalistic intervention to preserve autonomy, except that it emphasizes
dialogue and language rather than pure information exchange. It recognizes
that individuals often have difficulty exercising their autonomy for a number
of socially determined reasons. For example, an external constraint may
arise because public debate has misconceived the matter, may have employed categories or terms that were inadequate to the task, or may have
induced a person unreflectively to resolve the matter individually rather than
in concert with others.
Indeed, critics regularly call on us to transform the language (or its
categories) that our society affords us so that we can better comprehend
who we are. Thus, once feminist writers and feminist consciousness-raising
groups named previously unnamed assumptions about women and women's

lives, individuals could talk differently with each other and exercise their
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autonomy in ways that had been unavailable before. In his recent book,
James Q. Wilson makes a related point about the cultural weakening of the
belief in a moral sense, and a constriction in the public language in which
moral discourse is conducted." 2 This harm to a public good--our language
of moral discourse-disables individuals from expressing and nourishing
their moral sentiments. Wilson argues that, although existing in latent form
in most persons, laid down in our genes and childhood, these sentiments
need the cultivation of our society to gain a more potent voice."' Robert
our individualistic
N. Bellah's Habits of the Heart makes the same point:
4
culture undermines our finer communal sentiments."
Communitarians make a stronger dialogical claim. It is not simply that
the culture provides tools, such as a language, ideas, or ideals, that an individual may choose to employ to enhance her exercise of her autonomy.
Rather, participation in certain social roles and collective activities is actually constitutive of the individual self."' A decisionmaker is not autonomous
when she disowns, ignores, or alienates socially constituted parts of herself,
or when she holds herself back from that communal participation through
which she can become herself. To ignore those portions of the self is to
diminish one's autonomy, not express it. As to those parts that are rooted in
the collectivity, the community may actually have dialogical claims upon
her: in deciding she must participate and listen with respect to those aspects
of her self that are communally constituted.
Thus, in The Ethics of Authenticity, Charles Taylor complains about the
cultural debasement of the ideal of authenticity in a society that values
choice for choice's sake," 6 one in which the peculiar phrase "abortion for
convenience" manages to find, among some, a referent. Our malaise, he
claims, results from the increasingly flattened lives that people lead in our
atomistic and individualistic culture; they fail to appreciate that their selfabsorption obscures the horizons of communal significance from which an
uncorrupted ideal of authenticity draws meaning. Only in dialogue with
important others about joint human projects can authenticity in making
choices be worth pursuing.' 7

112

244-50 (1993).
observes that "our intellectual culture has left ordinary men and women

JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE

113 Wilson

alone to cope ....

They wish to make moral judgments, but their culture does not help

them do it." Id. at x. "A moral sense is not always and in every aspect of life strong
A moral sense must compete
enough to withstand a pervasive and sustained attack ....
with other senses that are natural to humans . . . ." Id. at 12.
114

See generally ROBERT N.

BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM

AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
115See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE

(1982).
116 CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY
117

Id.

39-40, 66-69 (1991).

832

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:3

Communitarians often refer to political participation--engaging in public
discourse, voting, jury service, office-holding, working-as key constitutive
activities through which the self finds public completion." 8 Surely less political roles also involve key socially constituted aspects of the self: events
like marriage and parenthood. Around such events-which constitutional
discourse now labels as private-complex religious and secular ceremonies
have from time immemorial marked a passage from one status to another. In
these new statuses, one is enlarged, in the sense that parts of the self find
completion and capacities are employed that previously had remained dormant; but one is also simultaneously constrained in that certain kinds of
liberty cannot thereafter be exercised, at least not without self-altering or
self-alienating consequences.
How might the state structure a dialogical process so as to educate a self
who depends on socially constructed tools like language, and who needs
others to complete herself? How shall it construct a procedure that reflects
back to the self the state's own more capacious view of her, like a trick
mirror-not one that distorts, but rather one that fills out to a more comely
or handsome, if thickened, form? How shall it appeal to silenced, neglected,
or not yet fully constituted portions of the self?119
It is unlikely that our individualistic legal culture has the means or the
authority for undertaking such an enterprise. Even if it did, there are enormously serious risks. In developing such a program of decision, the state
risks educating a woman into a person that she is not, or not yet. Then it
would not be her socially constituted autonomy that the state fosters, but a
best-interest, defined externally to who she is by someone else's vision of
who she should become. For this reason, if a communitarian analysis is to
have relevance for our legal system, it must remain rooted in a commitment
to an autonomous self, even as it elaborates a conception of that self that is
partially constituted in dialogue and participation.12 ' Without that commit11

See SANDEL, supra note 115.

One such effort occurs in Robert Burt's very fine book, Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in Doctor-PatientRelations. In it, Burt deals with the difficulty
occasioned when deciding whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from incompetent, and thus silent, patients. He proposes that all "interested" parties be involved in a
collective decisional process to determine whether to withdraw life supports from such
an incompetent patient. Further, they must deliberate without the immunity from subsequent criminal or civil liability that courts provide when they take over such
decisionmaking. Burt bases his proposal on this psychological understanding: our selves
are socially constructed and maintained only in interpersonal tension and struggle with
others. The notion of the autonomous self does service in every day matters, but in
extremis of death, when the patient's self dissolves, so in effect does the self of an individual decisionmaker in the case. We can therefore only proceed collectively in making
the identity-dissolving decision of death. ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANG119

ERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 144-73 (1979).
120 Ascertaining whether particular legal procedures in fact further the

autonomous
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ment to autonomy, anything goes; any "improvement" in a citizen's character to make it better cohere with society's values and institutions would be
justified. This is the risk that understandably leads liberals to warn
communitarians that their program verges on totalitarian re-education.'
B. Casey's Limits on a DialogicalProcess
Were such dialogical concerns on the minds of the Justices who decided
Casey? Yes and no. Arguably they considered this. After all, the joint opinion observed: "What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so."" But
they rejected the enterprise.
Admittedly, even Roe had dialogical elements. In looking to physicians
to mediate the abortion issue, the Court sought more than a way of protecting a woman's health. Some Justices appeared to believe that the physicianpatient relationship would afford a context for meaningful dialogue in which
a wise personal choice could emerge.' The physician might have been
seen as embodying social convention and thus as inhibiting what a woman
would seek and say; certainly Chief Justice Burger expressed the view that
the medical profession would restrain the uncontrolled discretion of women
to abort and that Roe did not allow "abortions on demand."'' Other Justices, less concerned with inhibiting a woman's choice and more interested
in fostering dialogue, might have considered that physicians are influenced
by wide experience with other patients, teachers, and colleagues, all reflecting and creating a social process of judgment. In particular, obstetricians
and gynecologists have daily experience with birth, adoption, the pain of
infertility, and contraception. Certainly Akron and Thornburgh suggested
that the majority put more faith in the dialogue between doctor and patient
than in scripted disclosures mandated by the state."n

choice of a socially constituted self may well require a different and more complex
methodology than that required by the positivist inquiry about autonomy-in-fact urged
supra part II.
121 Introduction, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICs 7 (Michael J. Sandel ed.,
1984).
'" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
1

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 748 (1985), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983), overruled in part by Casey,
505 U.S. at 833. The Justices in Roe may have been unaware of the fact that some
nurses and counselors in family planning clinics brought with them a tradition from
feminist consciousness-raising groups that in many instances turned the consent requirement into its own elaborate dialogical process. See, e.g., NINIA BAEHR, ABORTION
WITHOUT APOLOGY: A RADICAL HISTORY FOR THE 1990s 21-30 (1990).
'u

125
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While Roe involved these dialogical intimations, Roe and its successor
cases established three crucial limits on any dialogical process that a state
might seek to implement: a requirement of privacy, a prohibition against requiring spousal or paternal notice, and a judicial bypass for minors. 26
These limits largely eliminated the dialogical model, and Casey strongly
reaffirmed each of these limits.'27 This suggests that the Justices of the
plurality are not prepared to allow states to structure such dialogues and that
this is not what they had in mind in revising the trimester structure. This is
hardly surprising given the law's liberal individualistic impulse.
1. Excluding the Public: Privacy

The dialogical model is a core strategy of some anti-abortion groups. 28
Picketing abortion clinics is used as a way of opening a dialogue with women seeking medical care. The picketers try to communicate their understanding of the fetus, of the woman's plight, and of the alternatives she has, and
some offer to aid her during her pregnancy.'29 In the exercise of their First
Amendment rights, protestors may address speech to a clinic patient from
the streets and sidewalks, and thereby can intrude on her interest in informational privacy and her right to be let alone.
Whatever privacy is left to a woman once the protestors have talked at
her, seen her face, and possibly identified her car tags, the Supreme Court in
Casey sought to protect. As the Court had done previously, the Casey plurality required that information that she supplies to the medical profession
be kept confidential." 3° Thus Casey required that the decisional process not
be structured in a way that would disclose her name to the public.' A
" See Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-42 (judicial bypass); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (spousal notice); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54 (privacy).

"z Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897, 899-900 (1992).
'2

See, e.g., FAYE GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN

AMERICAN COMMUNITY 97-100 (1989) (describing the move towards this model by

pro-life protestors in Fargo, North Dakota).
129 See id.
10

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (citing Danforth's requirement

that state

recordkeeping and reporting provisions must properly respect a patient's privacy). Under the more relaxed undue burden test, Casey upheld additional medical record-keeping
requirements without requiring a strong state justification for the information. Id. at
900-01. As such, it increased the risk that the patient's and the referring physician's
names may be wrongfully disclosed. See Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
The Impact of the New Undue Burden Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269
JAMA 2249, 2250, 2255 (1993). Nevertheless, it did so only in deference to the state's
interest in promoting health. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900-01.
131 Greater

availability of abortions in hospital settings would permit greater privacy

to women seeking reproductive health services. Nonetheless, the Court has permitted
states to prohibit public hospitals from performing nontherapeutic abortions. See Poelker
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particular woman's abortion decision cannot be made into a public event
enabling anyone in the community to address her on this subject. Indeed,
said the Justices, the risk of a breach of privacy during a 24-hour waiting
period is a factor a court must consider in determining whether, as applied,
a waiting period is an undue burden.'32 Thus, in creating a buffer zone, a

California court has enjoined picketers from taking pictures of patients and
their license tags."

The California court reasoned that a failure to enjoin

v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam). Such a prohibition denies the anonymous
hospital setting to physicians wishing to avoid anti-abortion pickets outside clinics. The
Court allowed this prohibition by analogizing the public hospital case to the subsidy
cases, such as Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), in which the Court argued that the
state's decision not to pay for abortions in no way interfered with the private choice
guaranteed by Roe. Id. at 474. Nevertheless, this analogy fails to distinguish the state as
payor from the state as competitor whose operation of a hospital burdens the private
sector's ability to provide the same services. Chief Justice Rehnquist paid lip service to
this concern when he suggested that judicial intervention might be appropriate where
the state completely socialized private medicine, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 510 n.8 (1989), but this is an unrealistically stringent test for whether the
state has interfered with the market in hospital services, which is so heavily regulated
and in which barriers to entry-both legal and capital-are so high.
The growing consolidation of hospitals, in which non-religious institutions have
been purchased by religiously based institutions, has also reduced the number of hospitals providing abortion services (as well as an entire range of basic sex and reproduction-related medical services for women and men). See Tamar Lewin, With Rise in
Health Unit Mergers, Catholic StandardsFace Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at
B7; Shari Roan, When the Church and Medicine Clash, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at
Al. Among other reasons, the non-economic and ideological or religious motivation of
these restrictions may exempt them from antitrust and tort regulation of the "tying"
contracts through which these hospitals deny physicians use of their facilities for the
practice of abortion procedures.
132 Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.

3 See Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540
(Ct. App. 1993), afTd, 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal.), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994). For other
injunction cases, see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994);
American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994), afj'd, 47 F.3d
642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1426, 1437-39 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 67 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated in part, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en
banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Blythe,
39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189, 195, 199 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995); Feminist
Women's Health Ctr. v. Blythe, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Ct. App. 1993), vacated sub
nom. Reali v. Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985 (Mass.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
188 (1994); Robbinsdale Clinic, P.A., v. Pro-Life Action Ministries, 515 N.W.2d 88
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 622 A.2d 891 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993), affd, 638 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1994); Kaplan v. Prolife Action
League, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 436 S.E.2d 379 (N.C.
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the picketers from privacy-invasive practices would itself undermine the
exercise of the abortion right." 4
In guaranteeing privacy from anonymous others and prohibiting the state
from structuring the abortion decision as a public event-unlike marriage,
divorce, and birth, which are publicly recorded-the Court has decisively
affirmed that a woman making a reproductive choice may exclude the community from having its say.
2. Excluding the Husband
There are, however, particular persons who may be especially appropriate participants in assisting the woman in making her choice. If anyone has
formed a community of reproductive interest with a woman, it is her husband, (certainly more so than her lover, her own parents, or her religious
community). Of all other persons, he most likely has knowledge of her reproductive history and her reproductive interests. He is most prepared to
create with her the new circumstances that are conducive to raising a child.
He will have legal, financial, and psychological responsibility for the child if
it is born. He has the greatest communal interest in maintaining a reproductive unit with her.
Nevertheless, Casey reaffirmed that the state cannot structure the
decisionmaking process so as to require that the husband be notified or
participate in the abortion decision.135 In response to the husband's claim,
the plurality concluded that where the reproductive unit functions as a community, a pregnant woman can and does inform her husband. The state can
do nothing to enhance it, not even by expressing its support. On the other
hand, in those cases where the unit is not functioning as a community, the
mandated communication will not likely enhance dialogical functioning.
Indeed, the requirement will most likely cause things to go badly for the
married woman because it enables the male to exercise coercive power over
her-by physical violence against her, her children, or other relatives; by
coercive sexual practices or emotionally coercive tactics; or by a threat to
violate her interest in informational privacy by disclosing the abortion to
others." 6 Such concerns about coercion would seem to require only a
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2783 (1994); cf. People v. Belsan, 625 N.E.2d 913 (I11.
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Cozzens, 490 N.W.2d 184 (Neb. 1992); State v. Loce, 630
A.2d 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 636 A.2d 520 (N.J. 1993), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 1192 (1994).
134 Williams, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 546-47.
135See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98. As a practical matter, this holding distinguished
the joint opinion from the dissenting positions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas.
136 See id. at 887-98. This point again demonstrates the importance of informational
privacy to the Justices.
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spousal notice statute with a far broader set of exceptions than Pennsylvania
did
provided for cases of spousal abuse. 37 Nevertheless, the joint opinion
38

not invite legislatures to try again with a more adept classification.
Instead the joint opinion framed a more general objection. Because the
marriage relationship in the eyes of the law involves equally autonomous
adults, the state cannot subordinate the woman's autonomy to the man's: "A
husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before she
exercises her personal choices." ' To do so would be to subject a woman
to a paternal dominion: "A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children." 4 ' Such a nineteenth century model of women in marriage would, in the plurality's view,
be outmoded and inconsistent with the current understanding of equal rights
under law. 41 In effect, the Court simply rejected imposing on a competent
adult woman a dialogical community with her husband, and a fortiori with
any other party, be it genetic father, grandparent, or stranger.
This is not only a matter of gender equality. It also implicates the sharp
division drawn by the law between public power and private interests. The
fear of the private misappropriation of public power underlies the liberal
principle that the state may not put its power in the hands of private persons
who are unconstrained from pursuing their private ends.'42 For example, in

137 Following

Glendon's description of the French model, a statute might require a

woman to notify her husband unless she affirmed that notice would cause her "distress."
See GLENDON, supra note 13, at 15-22. The Pennsylvania statute provided that a woman could avoid the notice requirement by certifying that her husband was not the father,
that he could not be located, that the pregnancy resulted from a reported spousal assault,
or that notification would cause him or another to inflict bodily injury upon her. Casey,

505 U.S. at 887.
138 Broader exemptions would still compel, as a condition to receiving medical services, a woman to certify to a physician, and public officials reviewing the certification,
matters that are extremely private. As the opinion notes, situations of abuse, especially
sexual abuse, are matters about which women remain silent for years, even for a lifetime, coerced and shamed by their husband's violence. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 889-91
(noting district court's findings of fact); id. at 893 (observing that "[i]f anything in this
field is certain, it is that victims of spousal sexual assault are extremely reluctant to
report the abuse to the government"). Put differently, requiring a certification of his
wrongdoing from a woman coerced and shamed into silence by her husband's violence
communicates the state's view of her as subordinate to the husband.
139 Id. at 898.
140

Id.

141 See id. at 896-98. Again, in developing constitutional rules, the Supreme Court
properly takes into account the background conditions of private coercion against or in
which the state operates. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, PrivateDiscriminationand Public
Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 5-28.
142 This theme takes many forms in constitutional law. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1983); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 50610 (1946); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title & Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120-
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Danforth, the Court held that a spousal consent provision was invalid because the state could not delegate to the spouse a veto power which the state
itself could not constitutionally exercise." Without speaking of delegation,
the joint opinion continued in the same vein by focusing on the potential for
the husband to foist his private prejudice and interests on his wife through
the misuse of the public trust that a notice or consent provision involves.144 The Court's rejection of spousal notice confirmed that the
dialogical model is inconsistent with its understanding of the right of privacy, the atomistic "right to be let alone.' 45
3. Minors and the JudicialBypass

Children are subject to the same, or worse, physical, emotional and
sexual abuse as are wives. Nevertheless, that fact did not lead the joint opinion to spare children a father's or mother's involvement.1 46 Rather, the
Court reaffirmed parental notification and consent provisions, although it
also provided for a judicial bypass procedure for minors who seek abortions.1 47 Only with respect to minors has the Court affirmed the state's
power to structure a dialogical process by which parents can seek to elducate
the child and to create the communal conditions under which a decision for
abortion or for childbirth can be supported and integrated.
Consistent with their individualistic orientation, the Justices sometimes
try to portray parents as constrained by the best interest standard or as enhancing their child's informed consent by aiding her cognitive process-

es. 148 Obviously, parents go far beyond assuring informed consent and act-

23 (1928) (holding as violative of the Due Process Clause a portion of a zoning ordinance making issuance of a building permit conditional on the approval of two-thirds of
the other property owners in the affected area); Eubanks v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137, 143-45 (1912) (holding that a city ordinance requiring authorities to restrict construction on any block upon the request of two-thirds of the property owners could
allow the non-assenting property owners to be deprived of their property without due
process). Cf HANNAH ARENDT, ON REvOLUTION 256-57 (1963) (emphasizing public/private dichotomy).
"4sPlanned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
144 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 897-98.
145 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
146 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-90. Earlier, in Hodgson, the Court declined to distinguish minor consent provisions that require consent of both parents from those requiring
consent of only one. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450-55 (1990).
147 Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-90; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment in part); see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52; Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 468 (1993).
141 See, e.g., Matheson, 450 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring) (justifying provi-
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ing in their child's "best interests." Rather, parents are enabled to engage in
a far-ranging dialogical enterprise: of bringing to bear a range of values,
promising to create new conditions for their shared familial home, educating
their daughter in their conceptions of who she was and who she can and
should become, and calling upon her not to estrange herself from her
parents' conceptions of her. 49 The exercise of such dialogical influence is
appropriate to the family enterprise of rearing children because the law-and
liberal theory-recognizes that minors are not yet competent and autonomous adults and that they require such involvement to mature.
Even in the case of minors, however, the dominant values of individuality and autonomy, and the fear that power will be misused, leads the Court
to restrict the dialogical approach. Because parents can and do bring to bear
the same coercive pressures that husbands can place on wives, the Court has
mandated that an effective and private judicial bypass procedure be available
to allow a minor to circumvent her parents by obtaining a judge's consent to
an abortion. Further, the Court has restricted the dialogical process in which
judges-who are strangers to the child-can engage. It has directed a
judge's attention to only two questions that for the most part return the
procedure to the autonomy model of the previous section: (1) is the minor
mature enough to understand the abortion procedure and reach the decision
by herself under the narrow autonomy model; and (2) if not, is the decision
in her best interest, 150 which may involve a substituted judgment stan51
dard-itself powerful evidence of the primacy of the autonomy model.'
Studies of the judicial bypass procedure show a very high rate of judicial approval of minors' applications for abortion.1 2 For the most part,

sions, such as parental notice requirements, as "state efforts intended to ensure that the
decision be wisely made").
149 At least one court has correctly recognized that parental notice and consent requirements cannot factually be justified by an autonomy-based rationale, or by the paternalistic goal of enhancing the minor's decisionmaking by allowing the parents to
bring their wise counsel to bear. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 559 (Ct. App. 1994), review granted and superseded by 882 P.2d
247 (Cal. 1994) (en banc), rev'd, No. S041459, 1996 WL 155984 (Cal. Apr. 4, 1996).
In the case of abortion, parents simply are not constrained by the law to act in a way
that furthers either the autonomy or best interests of the child, so long as they do not
violate minimum standards precluding maltreatment.
"5 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 511 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.

Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
15

See MASS. R. CT., Super. Court Standing Order 5-81, 8.
e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 767 (D. Minn. 1986) (noting

152 See,

that during a five-year period, 3573 petitions for abortion were granted, six were withdrawn, and nine were denied), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd,
497 U.S. 417 (1990); Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN ThE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 149, 239-40
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judges accept simple evidence that the minor has the cognitive capacities of
abstract reasoning, which generally mature around age fourteen. Therefore,
judges tend to find that teens have the capacity under the narrow autonomy
model to consent.' Alternatively, judges find that an abortion is in the
minor's best interest, not a difficult finding for young adolescents often
pregnant as a result of statutory rape or worse, and for whom there is general medical evidence that pregnancy is inimical to their growing bodies.154
In addition, at least one study found that a number of anti-choice judges recused themselves from this process."'
Interestingly, when a judge is given the opportunity to engage in a more
substantive dialogue with a pregnant female, he appears to have nothing to
say. At least if he does not believe abortion is murder, he seems to recognize that it is a matter about which others-certainly uninvolved strangers-have nothing of consequence to offer. Based on our legal understandings, it is a choice that does not involve him as a communal participant with
the aborting woman.'56
In summary, the dialogical model is not what the joint opinion had in
mind. The lowered scrutiny of Casey did not lead to any additional structuring of a dialogical process with the public or with a spouse; and the parental dialogue with minors had been permitted by Roe's regime for over a
decade. The prevailing liberal ideals of autonomy and privacy place offlimits such compelled conversations in which, it is feared, private prejudice
and private coercion may exploit state power to gain authority over individual choice.
So what were the three Justices' goals when they revised Roe? What
state regulation-in addition to requiring physicians to employ an enlarged
notion of informed consent-did they seek to authorize? Put differently:

(Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985); Anita J. Pliner & Suzanne Yates, Psychological and
Legal Issues in Minors' Rights to Abortion, J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 203; cf. In re
Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (reversing finding of immaturity);
Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 833 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1992) (reversing juvenile court's en-

joining minor from having an abortion).
153
'"

See, e.g., MNOOKIN, supra note 152, at 239-40.
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 439 n.25 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting);

ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IssuES (Gary B. Melton ed.,

1986).
155 MNOOKIN, supra note 152, at 230.
15' Before Roe, something similar happened in the case of physicians who practiced
in jurisdictions that permitted abortion to protect the health of the woman. Kristin Luker
offers the example of California, in which the reform statute of 1967 rapidly evolved
into a regime of elective abortion within several years. Although physicians were permitted to provide abortion only for "health reasons," they nevertheless quickly came to
define a woman's health in terms of her own choice. LUKER, supra note 26, at 94, 134.
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under Casey, what can the state do to a woman that her husband can't? The
answer is found in the model of government speech.
IV.

THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH MODEL

Upon further reflection, our imagined Attorney General might retract his
last set of arguments for mandating dialogical interactions with the pregnant
woman in favor of a government speech model of state intervention:
"Perhaps we could accomplish some of what we aim for
under the rubric of informed consent. But it would be disingenuous to claim that we only care about her autonomy. And
to talk the language of a dialogical process in which a woman can discover her true self constituted in social dialogue
has a foreign sound, even to citizens of my own state of
brotherly and sisterly love. They do not want the state trying
to nourish the conditions necessary for realizing their true
selves.
"Rather, we agree with Mary Ann Glendon. We want to
give voice to other values that many of our citizens hold
regarding the sanctity of fetal life. We want to show concern
for the life of the unborn. We want to persuade women not
to follow their own preferences-what is called their convenience-but rather to behave in the way that we think is
right.
"Ronald Dworkin rightly recognized that the state can
take steps to express the sacredness of life; but he simply did
not make out a successful argument that fostering autonomy
is the road to implementing this reverence.' 57 If because of
Roe we cannot stop women from aborting, at least we can do
our best through speech to persuade them to desist. We will
deliver our message in schools, on radio, and on TV. But the
citizens of Pennsylvania will not be satisfied unless they
know that this message is expressed at the clinic to the woman who is about to abort.
"Our message will turn pregnant women against choosing to abort. Some will learn facts and change their minds.
Other trusting souls may be deterred simply by the weight of
the government's express opposition. Still, our deeper goal is
to reshape societal values at large and, thereby, the internal
values of our citizens. With new values will come new emo137 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, Eu-

THANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 12-15, 25-26, 148-51, 150-59, 237-41 (1993).
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tions. 58 Our citizens' own horror, shame, and guilt will
eventually limit their resort to abortion. As a result, controversy will diminish concerning informed consent procedures
that fully inform women of abortion's emotional harms,
which our educational program increasingly will have induced."
These arguments are consistent with the Casey's joint opinion:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing
so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has
that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to
persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. 159
Here we are face to face with Brandeis's "omnipresent teacher of us
all."' 60 Government speech may not suffer from those problems of speech
within the dialogical process insofar as the representative political process
filters out private prejudice and self-interest from the government's own
communications. Government speech, however, is still a very potent force.
Should this teacher be quieted and tamed? Does the Constitution limit the
government's power to get its message across? Scholars have discerned few
constitutional limits; but even these are more than the Court has been prepared to impose. So far, George Orwell has had more to say on this matter
than the Justices. Nonetheless, some limits on unrestrained government
speech may be discerned in Casey-limits that enjoy some buttressing from
certain trends in First Amendment jurisprudence.

158

See

NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES, DEATH WITHOUT WEEPING: THE VIOLENCE OF

EVERYDAY LIFE IN BRAZIL 400-45 (1992).

"" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992) (citation omitted); see

also id. at 869 ("permitting the state to show its concern for the life of the unborn").
"6 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (describing the state as
the "omnipresent teacher" of us all, but in the context not of government speech, but of
advocating government restraint, and that the government must obey its own law).

1996]

READING CASEY

A. Government Speech: Limits Under Casey
As a general matter, four kinds of limits on a government's message
may be identified: limits on its content, strength, location, and accuracy.
Few such limitations may be found explicitly in Casey.
Non-Neutrality as to the Message's Content. In Maher v. Roe,16 ' the
Court held that the state can fund childbirth, rather than abortion, in furtherance of its interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. In so holding,
the Court rejected one interpretation of Roe-that the state had to be neutral
with respect to a woman's choice to abort or give birth. Rather, under
Maher, the government may promote one or the other with its funding decisions. Accordingly, because the state may create monetary inducements for
live birth or for abortion, 2it may also, under Casey, employ words that advo16
cate one over the other.
Strength of the Message. Because the government may act strongly and
effectively when it acts legitimately, it presumably can choose to communicate with evocative and compelling language rather than with boring public
service sermons. As such, the government presumably may place, for
exam63
abortion.
against
advertisements
charged
emotionally
ple, powerful
Location of the Message. May the government use its power to force its
message into non-public settings not open to the speech of others? Specifically, does the state have a sufficiently significant interest to force delivery
of its non-neutral message to the woman while she is engaged in the decisional process with her physician? Roe answered that it does not. Prior to
viability, and absent a claim based on the state's interest in protecting her
health or her autonomous choice, the state lacked sufficient interest in the
fetus to interfere at the point of woman-physician interaction."6 The Casey
joint opinion jettisoned the trimester framework in substantial part because it
wished to allow the state to present arguments at the physician's office in
favor of childbirth that were extraneous to the woman's autonomy and her
well-being. 65 Yet speech at the point of decision in the doctor's office
may be particularly potent speech. Casey's undue burden test necessarily
establishes its own limits on the state's power to speak powerfully in this
432 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1977).
note 172 and accompanying text.
163 Although the government may enter both the advertising market and the public
forum as may any other speaker, presumably there are limits on the government's power to monopolize speech opportunities and to drown out others, or otherwise to accomplish what it cannot do through regulation.
164 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505
U.S. at 833; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983),
overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
165 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-76.
161

162See
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setting. Under this test, the state cannot try to dissuade a woman from having an abortion if it intends the message to be, or the message in fact is, a
substantial obstacle.'66 A too powerful, intense, or overbearing message
delivered with the intent or effect of overwhelming the woman's own deliberative powers would seem to be impermissible because it would undermine
the woman as the ultimate decisionmaker.
The Message's Accuracy. A false message also would be out of bounds
for the state, at least when delivered at the point of decision, for the state
must employ a means "calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it.' 67 Government deception at the point of decision constitutes a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice.
In sum, Casey would seem to adopt a standard permitting "persuasive
but not too overwhelmingly persuasive non-false speech." This standard may
be unsatisfyingly vague, but it is some advance on a general undue burden
test.
B. Government Speech: Other ConstitutionalLimits

In applying this vague standard, doctrines concerning government speech
derived from the First Amendment and other provisions and structural components of the Constitution may provide some additional guidance and support.'68 These doctrines are explored in the following four subsections:
limits on content, captive audiences, targeting and equality, and physician
speech rights.

166 Id.

at 874-79. A message that the pregnant woman should simply defer to the
state's opposition to abortion should therefore be impermissible.
167 Id. at 877.
u See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, 17-19, 141-306 (1983); Janet
Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion Information and the
FirstAmendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916, 1931-33 (1988); Thomas I. Emerson, The
Affirmative Side of the FirstAmendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 835-46 (1981); Theodore
C. Hirt, Why the Government Is Not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counseling and
Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895, 1904-15 (1988); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1105-19

(1979); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 617-22 (1980);
Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE
L.J. 581, 585 (1984) (reviewing YUDOF, supra); Frederick Schauer, Is Government
Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 377-79 (1983) (same); Steven Shiffrin,
Government Speech and the Falsification of Consent, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(1983) (same).
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1. Limits on Content
The weakest set of judicially cognizable First Amendment claims involves potential limits on the content of government speech. Without intending to suggest that any have much doctrinal bite, the sections below briefly
identify some arguments that might support a judicial restriction on the
content of government speech.
Viewpoint Non-Neutrality. The requirement of viewpoint neutrality in
government regulation of speech disappears when the government itself
speaks. Obviously the government can sponsor ads that disfavor drug usean illegal act-and ads that disfavor cigarette smoking-a legal act. With
respect to children, the state can go "very far indeed"'69 in educating them
by setting curricula and educational goals. The abortion-funding cases eliminated any doctrinal doubt as to whether the state has to remain viewpoint
neutral in its speech: the state may speak favorably of childbirth and against
abortion, and indeed, as Missouri did in the preamble of a statute, may declare that life begins at conception.17 Yet one can imagine state speech
that so violates the respect state officials owe the citizenry and their governing responsibilities that courts should intervene, but those limits have yet to
be judicially identified.
The Special Case of Religious Viewpoints. Government speech involving
religion is one of the few arenas in which neutrality clearly is mandated.
The state is prohibited from endorsing or employing, at least in coercive or
captive settings, religious arguments against abortion. 7 ' Examples of such
arguments include: be fruitful and multiply; we are formed in God's image;
our bodies are a gift to us for our use to His greater glory but not ours to do
with as we wish; God disapproves of abortion; those who have abortions
will rot in hell; or the returning Messiah is at risk of being aborted. Rather,
the government is to speak in a secular tongue when it seeks to persuade
women to adopt its views of the sacredness of life--even when clearly reliBecause Casey's joint opinion degious reasons are also available.'

169 Meyers

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).

Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511-13 (1989) (holding that
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a statutory declaration that lacked operative effect).
17 Even if Establishment Clause doctrine were diminished to an inquiry about coercion, requiring that religiously based messages be received at the abortion clinic as a
condition of consulting with a physician should be deemed inappropriately coercive.
172 If the state were to create a limited purpose public forum by developing a pamphlet in which anyone in the community could author a message to pregnant women
concerning abortion, such a forum might well have to be open to religious viewpoints.
See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994). It is doubtful,
though, that the state has a public purpose sufficient to compel a physician to deliver
10

such a pamphlet containing private messages and thereby convert her office into a limit-
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scribed the abortion right as having its roots deep in a woman's conscience, 73 one may expect the Justices to be especially sensitive to the
risks of religiously based government speech.
Equal Protection Values. Equal protection analysis of gender discrimination depends, in part, on the concept of stereotypes-at least those that are
archaic, outmoded, and unfriendly. 74 On these grounds, one might try to
challenge a state's secular appeals to women to fulfill their "natural" or
"traditional" functions as mothers. Similarly, speech urging racial pride and
the propagation of one's race, though5 technically race-neutral, should be
17
deemed part of an invidious tradition.
False Speech. When the government speaks through its own
distributional channels or purchases advertising time, an enforceable requirement of truth-telling is no doubt quite circumscribed. 7 ' (Even defamatory
statements are immune from suit except in very limited circumstances.'")
Thus, if the President scheduled a White House address at which he showed
portions of Silent Scream, no forum other than the political would be available in which to challenge its accuracy. Yet if a state legislature were to
require that a physician show Silent Scream to her aborting, first trimester
patients, could the physician or patient object on the ground that it was false
and deceptive government speech? When the state requires others to convey
its message, when it targets a message in a way calculated to induce reliance, or when it otherwise engages in situation-altering, autonomy-reducing
statements,1 78 the government more clearly steps outside the realm of discretionary government speech. One can imagine that courts would impose at
least some prospective limits on purposefully deceptive statements. Even if
courts, however, were to decline altogether to regulate the content of government speech that is directed at the public at large, one would expect judicial limits in the clinic setting where the pregnant woman is captive to the
government's message.

ed purpose public forum.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
175 Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
19th century physicians' campaign against abortion expressly appealed to such concerns. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 166-68 (1978).
7

176

YUDOF, supra note 168, at 135.

See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)
(holding that an absolute privilege protects from common law defamation actions a
government official's statements made within the "outer perimeter" of his office).
178 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57-63
17

(1989).
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2. Captive Audiences: Limits on Making Persons Listen
Even a non-abusing husband can bring to bear a persistent, relentless,
and all-pervasive message that can undermine a wife's capacity to close her
ears and make up her own mind. In rejecting spousal notice, Casey protected the wife from becoming her husband's captive audience. Should the
state's voice also be circumscribed so that it cannot gain unencumbered
access to a woman at a key emotional moment by conditioning her access to
an abortion upon her first listening to the state's anti-abortion message?
When the state delivers its message in mailings, leaflets, campaign
speeches, or television commercials, the unwilling listener can walk away,
turn the channel, or daydream. Pennsylvania requires that, as a precondition
to performing an abortion, physicians must offer their patients a pamphlet
containing state speech. Still, in not requiring that the patient read the pamphlet, the state protects a patient's right to avoid the mandated message,
albeit to a lesser extent than with messages delivered in less compelling
circumstances. If instead Pennsylvania were to condition access to an abortion on first receiving the message, such as by viewing a videotape or reading a pamphlet, clearly this would be a captive audience issue.179 Although
First Amendment doctrine may do little to fetter government speech in general, it does flag for special scrutiny government speech that exploits a
listener's inability to avert her eyes and ears. 80
The Court has held that municipal bus systems (and presumably elevators in a government office building) may impose on riders music piped in
from a local radio station.' The blandness or brevity of such messages

179 See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409, 1418-19 n.14 (D.S.D. 1994)
(requiring that a woman view a state's persuasive brochure is unduly burdensome),
affid, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995); cf New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council
v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that welfare recipients are a
captive audience at welfare office where checks are received); Planned Parenthood
League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1981) (pre-Casey finding that requiring that a woman to sign a consent form, which describes the stages of fetal development, is unduly burdensome); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding unduly burdensome a requirement that the physician who performs an abortion
must also conduct an informed consent consultation for his patient), appeal dismissed,
476 U.S. 54 (1986); Women's Medical Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F.
Supp. 1136, 1153-54 (D.R.I. 1982) (finding that requiring that a physician inform a
patient of the existence of state materials that describe fetal characteristics is unduly
burdensome); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 585, 591-92 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (Petree, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that requiring
that a woman receive a consent form that describes fetal development is unduly burdensome), dismissed, 68 Ohio St. 3d 1420 (1993).
180 See YUDOF, supra note 168, at 160-70, 296-98; Charles L. Black, He Cannot
Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1953).
181 Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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make the issue one of minimal consequence for many. The Court also has
permitted the government to label a foreign movie, a Canadian pro-environmental film, as "propaganda," and, thus, to condition access to the movie
upon first viewing the government's momentary comment upon the filmmaker's much longer communication.182 Determined to treat the label as
brief and formulaic, the Court characterized "propaganda" as a technical
word without any emotive or negative connotation in the circumstance of
the case. 3 Furthermore, unlike the abortion message at the clinic, the potency of the government's message was further reduced because it was
shown only after persons had exercised their right to see the movie by paying to enter the theater; the message was not aimed at having the substantial
impact of dissuading an uncertain audience from attending at all.
By contrast, courts have allowed the government to exploit captive-audience opportunities with messages of substantial moment, duration, and impact, when the government communicates to groups over whom it has particular regulatory powers. Such groups include children in school, government employees at work, and soldiers in the armed services." In these
settings, the government's managerial interests over its own property and
institutions have been deemed sufficient to justify its speech. Even with
strong managerial concerns in schools, the Court has, of course, made the
captive audience problem determinative in Establishment Clause cases in
which the impact of school-sponsored religious messages requires their prohibition. 5
M

A state's abortion message imposed at the clinic cannot be saved from a
captivity objection by invoking either a blandness exception or an exception
for the government's managerial claims over its property or institutions. On
the other hand, so long as the message is non-religious, the Court's government speech precedents do not clearly condemn such a clinic-focused message. The precedents simply fail to offer finer calibrations for evaluating
such government speech.
The Court, however, has seriously regulated non-religious government
speech in one set of cases involving the captive audience problem. These
cases involve speech that constitutes interrogation of persons in custody." 6
The due process voluntariness and Miranda standards limit communication
that seeks to dominate and control government captives, that overwhelms
182 Meese

v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
Id. at 484-85.
18
Parents, however, ultimately can avoid the captive audience problem by paying
for private schools, and workers can avoid the problem by not accepting government
employment. At present, the armed forces are also voluntary.
185 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
186 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
303 (1980); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
183
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their autonomous choices regarding their own speech, and that dissolves the
private space between the individual and state that a liberal society recognizes and preserves. Several aspects of these cases are noteworthy.
First and foremost, the Court has allowed the auditor to quiet the state.
Under Miranda v. Arizona,'87 the interrogator must, except in routine administrative matters and certain emergency situations, remain silent unless
and until the captive listener consents to the persuasive speech. 8
This is linked to a second theme, the vulnerability of the captive. Because he lacks control over the length and intensity of the government's
speech, the suspect seized for questioning is vulnerable to his state interlocutor. How should the woman's vulnerability at an abortion clinic be compared, if the state conditions her access to an abortion on her first listening
to the government's message? If her lack of physical control over her body
is occasioned not by an arrest but by a pregnancy rapidly developing from
within, is the state more free to exploit this circumstance?
Moreover, the Court has shown as much concern with governmental
appeals to conscience as with appeals to self-interest. Because "conscience
does make cowards of us all,"' ' 89 the Court has ruled out of line an

officer's efforts to persuade the arrested suspect to "do the decent
thing"-unless he first consents to being addressed by waiving his right to
counsel and his right against self-incrimination."l These cases evince a
mistrust of the police officer as moral spokesman for the community. The
suspect may mistakenly view the officer as a friend, with advice that is
disinterested and accurate, only to find that he was used instrumentally and
then abandoned to an adversary system once he has confessed.19 ' The
Court should also be concerned when the state exploits a physician's helping relationship to deliver a message that state aid is at hand; for if such a
message cannot be justified under the autonomy model-and can be justified only as government speech-it is probably not aimed at helping the
woman. The reality is that the baby who may be born is hers and hers
alone, and no web of societal provision exists that will adequately supply
the help she may need to rear her child and care for herself.
These specific themes reflect a more general theme in the due process
voluntariness cases: the search for an elusive space between state pressure
and the individual self in which free will can be said to hold sway. Invasion
of this space dissolves that realm of personal privacy in which the independent self can act. This is a space that the Court has traditionally understood
as characterizing a liberal and free society.

17 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18

Id. at 440.

189 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET
'9
1

act 3, sc. 1.

Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (Sixth Amendment case).
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
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Admittedly, an additional value of non-compelled incrimination centrally
shaped the Court's inquiry in these criminal cases. Yet these same concerns
should be considered when the state wedges its message into the privacy of
the doctor-patient relationship, in a matter that involves a different fundamental right. Perhaps these concerns add no clear additional limit to Casey's
insistence that the state must act to aid rather than to derogate from the
woman's own decision, but they do at least suggest the kind of sensitive
inquiry that a court ought to make in implementing Casey's standards. The
length, intensity, and honesty of the message will be highly relevant. Appeals to conscience will not be exempt from regulation. Most important of
all, in cases of non-routine messages that aim to persuade a woman not to
exercise her right, the government may offer its message but may not require her to listen.'
3. Equality and Targeting

One aspect of the captive audience problem has nothing to do with coercion: the inequality in burdens that results from targeting a message on
captives. Delivering a message at the abortion clinic that also is delivered
more generally is quite different from the government targeting its message
only at the clinic's patients. Targeting the patients alone reduces the likeli" An ambiguity in the joint opinion, see supra note 85, might lead some, incorrectly, to believe that the state's interest in expressing its view about the fetus (as distinct
from its interest in protecting the woman's autonomy), justifies forcing its speech upon
an unwilling listener through a mandatory 24-hour period of delay. Although the state
may add its voice to that of others, and may under Casey even gain access to a private
relationship to speak where the public cannot, it should not be able to force its message
upon an unwilling auditor through a mandatory waiting period. Not only would such a
delay greatly magnify the captive audience problem, it would impose serious adverse
health effects and other costs upon the woman, see supra text accompanying notes 10406, solely to further the government's interest in forcing its message upon her.
If a court were tempted to permit the government to go that far, it would then need
to distinguish the varying strengths of the government's interests in its own messages,
in as much as not every interest in a message should be deemed sufficient to justify a
waiting period. For example, its interest in speaking to protect particular persons (for
example, advising a divorced parent against remarrying in circumstances that will interfere with his support obligations to a child, cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978)), may be greater than its interest in speaking on behalf of potential persons (such
as fetuses or future generations), which in turn may be greater than its interest in protecting itself (as in speaking to encourage women to produce future soldiers and workers for the fatherland). Furthermore, requiring a physician to deliver a message that the
fatherland prefers that women give birth to future workers and soldiers sounds fascistic.
This in turn raises the possibility that not all state interests favoring childbirth equally
justify requiring a physician to convey this preference. This interest in soldiers and
workers may suffice to justify state funding of childbirth over abortion, see Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 n.11 (1977), but not a state-sponsored message.
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hood that political processes will subject the message to debate and control.
To the extent that government speech spares the general public, it spares
itself from political constraint.
In evaluating the justification for such targeting, one would need to
balance efficiency against the resulting lack of political accountability. On
one side is the presumed economy that comes from targeting the affected
population at the moment when its members have focused attention on the
subject of the speech. Money is not wasted in addressing irrelevant persons,
and the message has its maximum impact by virtue of its salience to the
listener. Thus, cigarette packs and not candy bars warn of the risks of smoking. In Meese v. Keene,'93 the government did not engage in general edu-

cation programs for the cinema-going public; rather, only those foreign
movies deemed to be "political propaganda" carried the warning. In the
abortion context, however, one might well doubt the claim of efficiency."'
If the anti-abortion message is to be effective, it must be delivered at a time
before men and women make their contraceptive-abstinence choices so that
reliance on abortion as a back-up can, in some circumstances, be minimized.195 Delivering the message only after conception is too late.
Even if it were efficient, 196 targeting the clinic forces only one subclass-pregnant women seeking abortion-to hear and bear the burden of
the message. Although represented in court by well-organized lawyers, this
group's members, by virtue of their situation, are politically vulnerable in
their ability to contest more egregious elements in such messages. More
broadly delivered anti-abortion messages might arouse popular opposition.
Certainly, less-sequestered government speech campaigns aimed at encouraging safe sex among students have elicited deep controversy and as a result
have been altered.1" Government speech about cigarettes also offers instruction: not limited to cigarette packages, it is widespread enough to reach
19

481 U.S. 465 (1987).

194

Id. at 470.

'9' Making the message generally available, as in a broader distribution of brochures,
would also eliminate the two-visit requirement in the informed consent process for those
women who could certify that they had access to the brochure prior to the abortion. Of
course, even conscientious contraceptive use or efforts at abstinence will not eliminate
the need for all abortions. Our contraceptive technologies are far from perfect, circumstances arise after conception that lead women to abort, and much sexual activity leading to conception is coercive.
19" The issue is not only one of efficiency but of meaning. The act of targeting the
message only on pregnant women seeking abortions is itself an additional message that
informs women that the government shows diminished regard for their control over
their reproductive lives. By contrast, a pre-conception message opposed to abortion-one delivered generally to women and men--expresses some respect for women's
autonomous choices over their reproductive and sexual lives.
197 See, e.g., Rick Badie, On Sex Education Most CandidatesSupport the Status Quo,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 13, 1994, at 1.
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nonsmokers as well as smokers, allowing all to judge the appropriateness of
the message.
How efficiency concerns are to be balanced against reduced political
accountability concerns is certainly an open question under the amorphous
calculus that a court brings to bear on government speech issues. In interpreting Casey, however, it should be kept in mind that federal courts have
long acted to ensure that an otherwise problematic statute defines its affected class sufficiently broadly to ensure effective political accountability.'98
4. Physicians' Speech Rights: Having the Last Word

After Casey cleared the way for Pennsylvania's abortion statute to go
into effect, a Pennsylvania Planned Parenthood clinic in Allentown distributed, as required, a state-prepared brochure on fetal development. The clinic,
however, stamped on each pamphlet: "This material was prepared by the
Pennsylvania Department of Health. It contains some biased and inaccurate
information and is not endorsed by the Allentown Women's Center." 1"
May the physician thus undermine the government's message, or can
Pennsylvania forbid physicians from engaging in such speech?2' Furthermore, if negative experience with this brochure accumulates, may a physician again challenge the entire brochure (and the statute as applied) on the
ground that it substantially distorts her professional communications with
her patient? In other words, do the free speech rights of physicians as members of a learned profession further restrict the power of the state to speak
effectively and powerfully to women at the point of decision?
Several opinions, including the Casey joint opinion, impliedly have
rejected such a general claim for professional speech rights, and, it seems,
so might prevailing First Amendment doctrine.2"' Such a free speech analysis would presumably minimize the protected status of a physician's speech
by characterizing it as non-public speech: on a subject not of public or general interest, addressed to a single person in a confidential relationship.'

198

See Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 676-77 (1981)

(plurality opinion); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177, 187 (1938); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 333 (1819).
"9Abortion Clinics Struggle with New Pennsylvania Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26,
1994, at 7.
The physician's speech is, of course, subject to malpractice limitations that the
physician's statements not be harmful or below standard practice.
" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion),
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977); see also Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 802 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
' See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-
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Furthermore, as Justice White has argued, such speech occurs within a commercial relationship subject to broad regulatory powers, reviewable under
the lowest level of scrutiny.2"3 Although the particular facts of Casey did
not require a careful examination of this issue, the joint opinion seemed
drawn to such an analysis: "To be sure, the physician's First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medi"' Thus,
cine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. ''2
in both religious and non-religious matters, the state generally may not compel an individual to adhere to a doctrinal orthodoxy and engage in prescribed speech, be it a mandatory flag salute or carrying "Live Free or Die"
on a license plate.2" 5 Nevertheless, when that same individual assumes a
professional or other work role, Casey suggests that reasonable regulation
may diminish or eliminate this right not to be required to endorse-by
words or silence-prescribed speech.
Finally, to the extent the physician is employed in a public facility or
with public dollars, the scope of her speech possibly may be further curtailed under Rust v. Sullivan,2' by the government's decision not to pay
her to speak about the state's brochure or other abortion-related matters.
It is the task of this section to sketch a counterargument: that Casey and
current First Amendment doctrine have underestimated the substantial individual and societal interests in the physician's free speech. Such interests
should preclude the wholesale regulation of physician speech and should
limit the state's own speech inside the patient-physician relationship. Indeed,

63 (1985) (plurality opinion); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-49 (1983).
" See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 802-03 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "nothing
in the Constitution indicates a preference for the liberty of doctors over that of lawyers,
accountants, bakers, or brickmakers").
' Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (citation omitted); see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 830
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that requiring a physician to inform a woman of
state sponsored materials "may create some possibility that the physician or counselor is
being required to 'communicate [the state's] ideology"') (alteration in original).
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that an individual
may not be prosecuted for declining for religious reasons to display state motto on
state's license plate); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (holding that a regulation that compels students to salute the American flag
invades their First Amendment rights); see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500
U.S. 507, 514-19 (1991) (outlining the constitutionally permitted standards within which
a state may require that public employees contribute fees to a union); Riley v. National

Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-801 (1988) (holding that a state
may not compel professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors, prior to an
appeal for funds, the percentage of contributions collected during the previous year that

were actually turned over to charity); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
234-35 (1977) (holding that a requirement that local government employees contribute
fees to union for political activities infringes the employees' First Amendment rights).

500 U.S. 173 (1991).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:3

Rust implicitly recognizes this argument, despite the specific holding of that
case.2 7 This counterargument will first lay a lengthy, if sketchy, foundation about the nature of professions, and then address the specific questions
raised above in connection with the Pennsylvania statute. Finally, the counterargument will consider Rust.
Developing this argument is important for several reasons. Casey's focus
on government speech at the point of service delivery will require courts to
consider this important issue more extensively if states accept the joint
opinion's invitation to regulate in this manner. Moreover, the speech rights
of the learned professions were the proper doctrinal foundation for the holdings in Thornburgh and Akron that a state cannot wedge its distorting message into the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship and thereby alter, for
the state's ends, the doctor and patient exchange.2 8 By locating the basis
for this holding primarily in the privacy rights of the woman, these cases
missed a firmer anchoring in the free speech interests of patient, physician,
and society. Perhaps as a result of this doctrinal mislocation, the joint opinion in Casey too easily overruled this aspect of Thornburgh and Akron.
Finally, as a non-constitutional matter, the pressure for health care reform and the changing market in health services are focusing attention on

the speech of professionals who are increasingly becoming government,
corporate, and partnership employees. As physicians' practices as employees
become subject to increasing constraints,2" their speech as professionals

Id. at 200; see also infra part IV.B.4.d. For other discussions of the speech rights
of physicians, see Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient
Disclosure and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201
(1994); Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1724 (1995); cf Meyer v. Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary, 330 F. Supp. 1328 (D.
Mass. 1971).
See supra note 192.
This problem has just started to get national attention. See Rachel Kreier, N.Y.
Suit Fights Increasingly Common HMO Gag Rules, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 11, 1995, at
8; Robert Pear, Doctors Say H.M.O.s Limit What They Can Tell Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1995, at Al; see also U.S. Healthcare to End Limits on Doctors' Advice to
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at D2.

For one example of an HMO speech restraint, consider the following provision in a
hypothetical contract between an HMO and its physician:
Philosophy
a. Each physician must be supportive of the philosophy and concept of
[the HMO] ....
b. Physician shall agree not to take any action or make any communication which undermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees, potential
enrollees, their employers, their unions or the public in [the HMO] or the quality
of [its] coverage.
The contract also provides that the physician agrees not to disclose the content of the
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ought to remain substantially unfettered by their employers. In particular,

physicians will need to inform patients of the inadequate medical treatment
that health systems may be providing to them. For example, when health
care systems do not offer diagnostic tests to various classes of patients,
physicians must be free, without retribution, to advise their patients that they
are being denied appropriate care. In turn, interactions must be free enough
so that physicians will learn from patients about their interests so as to inform increasingly bureaucratic health care systems of appropriate reform.
a. The FirstAmendment Protects Structures of Knowledge
As a first step in the argument for professional speech rights, it is im-

portant to recall that the First Amendment presupposes and protects a number of institutional arrangements that facilitate the generation and diffusion
of knowledge to promote individual and societal well-being and community
self-governance. In identifying these several institutional arrangements that
deserve First Amendment protection, I mean something more than the recent
calls for sensitivity to the institutional contexts in which speech occurs, such
as the Court's announcement: "We deal here with the law of bill-

agreement "to any third party, except to federal, state and local governmental authorities
having jurisdiction."
A state ought to decline to enforce such a contract provision that limits physician
speech to patients. The state should also decline to shield HMOs from tort actions by
physicians who suffer adverse employment consequences for their professional speech.
The hard constitutional question is whether the First Amendment requires a state to
shape common law tort and contract rules to protect speech. Compare New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
For a discussion of private employee speech rights, see generally DAVID W. EwING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION: BRINGING CIVIL LIBERTIES TO THE
WORKPLACE 101 (1977); Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace:
Using the FirstAmendment as Public Policy for Wrongful DischargeActions, 55 OHIO

ST. L.J. 341 (1994); Charles A. Edwards, Protection of the Complaining Employee:
How Much is Too Much?, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 207 (1980); Cynthia L. Estlund, What
Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression
Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1992); Ann M. Gill,
Public Concern and Public Policy: Freedom of Speech in the Workplace, 28 FREE
SPEECH Y.B. 93 (1990); Orlan Lee, Freedom of Speech vs. Loyalty to the Firm and Coworkers, 16 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 45 (1983); Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in
the Private and Public Workplace: Two Doctrines or One?, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 711
(1977); Jane A. Villemez, The First Amendment and the Law Enforcement Agency:
Protecting the Employee Who Blows the Whistle, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 789
(1983); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791 (1992); Charles Glick, Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State
Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522 (1982); George E. Stevens, Comment, Freedom of
Speech in Private Employment: Overcoming the "State Action" Problem: Rozier v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 102 (1982).
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boards."2 ' Such sensitivity usually refers to the application of general
marketplace principles to various settings with special attention in each
setting to differences in the countervailing state interests, the administrability
of doctrinal rules, and the alternative avenues of communication. Here my
focus is on the different institutions of knowledge that have developed in our
society and the different principles of organization that they have adopted
for their knowledge practices. Although some of these institutions of knowledge provide for individual participation by any would-be speaker in a nonhierarchical setting and without a priori criteria for the acceptability of their
speech, others do not.
The non-hierarchial institutions include two overlapping ones: the marketplace of ideas and the domain of public discourse.
Marketplace of Ideas. The dominant doctrinal description of the institution that produces and disseminates knowledge is, of course, the free market.2 ' In it ideas compete unencumbered by regulation, entry into the arena of communication is open to anyone with a voice (be it a pen, a mimeograph machine, or a modem); and the system of unfettered competition
identifies the most popular, accurate, or useful ideas. Maximizing knowledge
and information justifies this institutional arrangement.
Public Discourse. Meiklejohn identified a second institution, the domain of speech involved in democratic self-governance.212 Through such
speech, decisions are made collectively. This domain involves openness to
ideas on the public agenda, subject to impartial restraints of time, manner,
and place. The speaker is for the most part presumed to be an individual
citizen, or a corporate speaker that is treated as an individual. In an important contribution, Robert Post has begun to map the Court's concept of a
domain of public discourse-more inclusive than Meiklejohn's-through
which collective self-definition is achieved.213 Distinguishing public disMetromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opin-

210

ion).
For calls for greater institutional sensitivity, see, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering

the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in InstitutionalContexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1990); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management. The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
For examples of the institutional analyses urged here, see Robert M. O'Neil, Libraries,Liberties and the FirstAmendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973); David M.
Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"Academic Freedom
Under the FirstAmendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990).
211

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For

critiques of the market metaphor, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-24 (1989); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 48-50; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree
Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 595-65 (1995).
212 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1945); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
213

ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MAN-
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course from other forms of more regulated speech in everyday life and from
arenas subject to the instrumental rationality or "managerial" authority of the
state, he has mapped the domain of public discourse not only physically in
various fora but also in various cultural practices. This domain assumes
conditions of free entry into the speech process and the absence of any a
priori criteria or agenda for judging the acceptability of ideas or speakers.
Self-definition and self-governance justify the freedoms of this regime.
There are, however, other institutions and other principles by which our
free and democratic society produces, organizes, and disseminates knowledge and ideas. Some of these institutions are essential to a democratic
society, serving to inform citizens in matters of public concern and to build
the democratic character of the citizenry. Other institutions are essential to a
liberal society, providing knowledge that enhances the enjoyment of fundamental liberties and the autonomous choices that serve individual well-being. Among these are institutions that are organized hierarchically, exclusively, through the exercise of power, and with a priori criteria for the acceptability of speech. The First Amendment protects such institutions as
well-some explicitly, some implicitly:
Clergy. The Constitution specifically protects the organization of the
clergy through the religion clauses." 4 It protects the power of different denominations to organize their clergy as they see fit; to establish training
institutions with standards of admission, of progression, and of graduation;
and to set standards of knowledge through governing boards, journals, and
educational institutions. Thus, it should not be open to the legislature to
impose principles of academic freedom on theological seminaries. The California legislature recently extended to students free speech rights vis-A-vis
private educational institutions.215 Even if this were constitutional,216 the
act does not and could not extend those rights to the faculties of religious
institutions training the clergy. The First Amendment prevents a legislature
from determining that a religious institution has an academic mission of free
inquiry that precludes it from censoring a faculty member. Rather, clerical
institutions may develop their own method of furthering their understanding
of religious knowledge. 7 Accordingly, a hypothetical academic in a Cath-

AGEMENT

214

(1995).

U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ").
215 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48950 (West 1993), 94367 (West Supp. 1996).
216 Professor Eule forcefully argues that it is not constitutional. See Julian N. Eule,
Prescribing the Orthodoxy of the First Amendment: With Every Wish There Comes a
Curse (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
217 See generally Charles E. Curran, Academic Freedom and Catholic Universities, 66
TEX. L. REv. 1441 (1988); Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1455 (1988); Michael W.
McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities, 53 LAw &
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olic university who was disciplined by the school for his dissenting speech
favoring abortion rights should have no free speech claim.21
Press. The Constitution not only guarantees the speech rights of individuals but specifically identifies rights of institutions identified as the "press,"
such as newspapers and book publishers, that develop, organize, and disseminate information and ideas.219 This institutional focus protects the hierarchical organization of the press from substantial interference with the nonfalse messages that the owners of that press choose to deliver. For example,
imagine, contrary to fact, that Congress concluded that the growing concentration of media power and the homogenization of media opinion required
not just far more aggressive antitrust and FCC regulation, but also a prohibition on discrimination in hiring and firing of reporters based on their ideas.
Accordingly, suppose it amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to forbid employment discrimination for political beliefs.22 Presumably, a
court would have to think long and hard before it would apply this law to
the press in favor of a reporter who was fired because of the excellence of
her investigative reports that were inconsistent with the paper's political
stance. A statute preventing an editor from censoring a reporter's writing
would be immediately dispatched. Indeed, the Court has already struck
down a requirement that newspapers open their letters to the editor columns

CONTEMP. PROBS. 303 (1990). The American Association of University Professors,

however, need not respect such choices by religious institutions.
216 See RABBAN, supra note 210, at 269 n.196 (citing Curran v. Catholic Univ. of

Am., No. 1562-87 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1989)). The fired professor might have a
contract claim, based on specific prior promises, but presumably enforceable only
through damages and not specific performance.
219 Certainly the holding of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
is based in part on special institutional considerations of the press with respect to difficulties in fact-checking and sales across multiple jurisdictions.
Sometimes the Court has resisted explicitly recognizing the special status of the
press with respect to free speech rights. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663 (1991) (affirming recovery for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (upholding a state's extension of
sales tax to cable television services while exempting print media); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that a trial cannot be closed to the
press because the general public's right to attend trials is implicit in the First Amendment); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding the prohibition
on personal interviews between the media and inmates). The Court, however, has also
evidenced special concern for the press's constitutional status. See Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of the Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (holding that a
special use tax on paper and ink products used for publications violates the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Press
Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980).
220 Cf CAL. LABOR CODE § 1101 (West 1996) ("No employer shall ... enforce any
policy: (a) Forbidding ... employees from engaging ... in politics ... [or] (b) ...
tending to control . . . the political activities or affiliations of employees.").
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to officials exercising a "right of reply" to criticism, and a rule against editorializing imposed on recipients of public broadcasting funds.22'
Attorneys. Like the learned profession of the clergy, the learned profession of lawyers also enjoys some special rights in speaking-at least in
speaking with clients. These rights derive in part from the client's Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective representation and the Due Process
Clause's protection of a fair hearing. In addition, the First Amendment
equally preserves the right of the attorney to proffer advice.222 For example, imagine that a state forbade criminal defense attorneys admitted to jailhouse interviews from counseling criminal defendants about possible civil
actions that they could bring against the police or the prison authorities.
Because procedural rules can preclude such suits until the termination of the
criminal prosecution,223 legal advice concerning the civil suit might be unnecessary for an effective Sixth Amendment defense. Nonetheless, such a
prohibition would run afoul of the legal profession's own conception of
legal representation.224 That professional conception deserves a court's respect as it evaluates a lawyer's First Amendment challenge to such a prohibition.
University. The Court has long recognized the doctrine of academic freedom,22 although it is not specifically mentioned in the First Amendment.
This doctrine affords some protection for the right of the individual professor, teacher, and student in a public university to speak her mind within and
outside the classroom. The doctrine, however, also protects the institutional
autonomy of the university to make academic decisions governing teachers
and students. The university may develop standards "to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
.221 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 397-99 (1984); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
22 See Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar Ass'n, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-30 (1963) (noting that "litigation is thus a form of political
expression"); In re New Hampshire Disabilities Rights Ctr., 541 A.2d 208, 213 (N.H.
1988) (affirming right of nonprofit corporations to advocate the enforcement of legal
rights); cf. Gentile v. Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1065-75 (1991) (reviewing restriction on
attorney's extra-judicial speech during pending prosecution); Student Gov't Ass'n v.
Board of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 476-78 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding termination of legal
services for students); Westchester Legal Servs. v. County of Westchester, 607 F. Supp.
1379, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (prohibiting firing); Northern Pa. Legal Servs. v. County of

Lackawanna, 513 F. Supp. 678, 683 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
2
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). For other hypotheticals related to
Rust, see William W. Van Alstyne, Second Thoughts on Rust v. Sullivan and the First
Amendment, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 5, 7 (1992) (hypothetical offered by Dean Stone).
224 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1994).
' See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (holding that state
inquiry into a professor's political convictions and the contents of his lectures invades a
professor's liberty of academic freedom and political expression).
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'
taught, and who may be admitted to study."226
An analogous protection for
227
public libraries has also been crafted.
Medicine. The learned profession of medicine should enjoy professional
speech rights as well. In league with clergy and lawyers, physicians formed
the historical basis of the university,22 which now enjoys First Amendment protection in addition to and independent of protections enjoyed by the
clergy and the bar. The lack of explicit constitutional recognition of the
medical profession should not preclude judicial recognition of physician
speech rights, based on that profession's important contribution to societal
and individual interests in knowledge.

b. The Nature of the Learned Professions

Some narrowly focused economists see professions as simply rent-seeking cartels, employing the regulatory power of the state to enhance their
economic power."' Others with a more Weberian conception properly
identify a broader range of status attributes.23 Certain sociologists and
feminists focus instead on the profession's elite hegemonic domination over
life and discourse as they control, in the service of the powers that be, our
thought and behavior regarding important life functions, including access to
God, to justice, and to health.
"6 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615,
631 (1980), appeal dismissed as moot, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (observing that "the State may not, consistently with the

spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge"). See
generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981); id. at 277 (Stevens, J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Tinker v. Des Moines

Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
' See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (holding that the First
Amendment limits the power of a local school board to remove library books from high
school and junior high school libraries for impermissible content-based reasons); Ameri-

can Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Mark
Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean
Point, 59 INDIANA L.J. 529 (1984). See generally O'Neil, supra note 210, at 209.
The focus of this Article's argument is on the traditional learned professions of
clergy, law, and medicine that formed the basis of the university. But the argument
applies to ancillary professions as well, such as librarians who are essential to the func-

tioning of the university and other professions. In fact, the argument applies to any
practice involving specially trained persons who are governed by a code establishing a
commitment to a realm of knowledge and its application.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 3-11 (1955).
229 ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY

13 (1994).
230 ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 7-19 (1986).
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These various positions, however, are partial or distorted as other theorists have argued. For example, one of the current leading theorists of professions, Eliot Freidson, defines a profession in terms of its status and its
power to restrict the market in the services it provides; but he also understands that a profession is a social organization of knowledge.23' Through
the exercise of a professions's hierarchical and hegemonic power, knowledge is developed, organized, preserved, passed on to the next generation,
and made available and applied to society and the individual. Accordingly, a
theory of the professions and a theory of the First Amendment are inseparable.
One can distinguish two forms of professional knowledge and associated
organizational practices: systematic formal knowledge and knowledge applied to a case.
i. Systematic FormalKnowledge
With their power, professions define what is in the corpus of the
profession's knowledge: they determine what knowledge and skills their
members are taught in school in order to graduate; what they must know to
pass a professionally administered qualifying exam for each level of professional competence; what they must acquire through continuing education
programs; and what knowledge they must possess to withstand malpractice
actions. A profession's control over knowledge extends to the certification
of training schools, the operation of libraries and the concomitant organization of cataloguing and data retrieval systems, the publication of textbooks
and peer review journals, and the holding of annual meetings. In addition,
professions affect the development of new knowledge through research, by
direct funding decisions, and by influencing funding sources through advisory boards. Professions also regulate who possesses knowledge by controlling
admission into professional training schools as well as into the profession
itself, and by exercising their power to discipline members who fall below
professional standards of practice.
ii. Knowledge Applied to a Case
Professionals may develop knowledge by following the logic of their
field or their own idiosyncratic interests. As with academics, they may transmit knowledge to the public by entry into the common market of lectures,
articles, and books. An additional very powerful institution exists within

23'

See

ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF

MEDICAL CARE (1970); FREIDSON, supra note 229; FREIDSON, supra note 230; see also
ANDREW D. ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF

EXPERT LABOR (1988) (emphasizing jurisdiction and jurisdictional disputes regarding
professional control of a problem); STEPHEN G. BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE
CHANGING ROLES OF PROFESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE (1994).
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certain professions for the transmission of existing knowledge to lay persons
and for the generation of new knowledge in the field. This institution, of
great moment to individual lives, is "the case."
In handling a case, a professional does not speak generally into an open
domain of a free market or of public discourse, but to a single person in
confidence. The professional brings general knowledge to bear on the
unique circumstances of a particular client in the context of a professional
helping relationship. The special relationship is employed in part so that the
client will speak freely because confidentiality and interest are promised and
hope elicited. As a result of this confidential exchange, knowledge more
accurately can be brought to bear for the client's benefit. The case is also
necessary because the profession's formal knowledge is complex but partial,
and the individual requires more than access to a library to enjoy its benefits: a trained professional, informed by education, practical wisdom, experience, and empathy, is required to bring the general to bear on the particular,
on the client's needs.
Through the case, a professional also develops knowledge, in the sense
that a specific application of general knowledge always involves elaboration
and specification. Further, in a case she can test the professions's general
knowledge; and she stands ready to refine or alter it, on behalf of the profession and society, through a "case report" in a professional journal. Such
testing serves not only to refine existing knowledge; the case is also an
essential setting for the profession's testing of hypotheses and generation of
new ideas and research programs. Thus, at its best, the case involves a twoway exchange between the profession's general knowledge and an
individual's particular needs.
In a case, the speech interests of the professional, in transmitting and
developing knowledge, meet up with the liberty interests of the client being
served.232 These liberty interests are not amorphous and unspecified. The
speech rights of the clergy join the free exercise rights of the parishioner.

First Amendment theory may be divided between those who believe that the
Constitution's protection of speech serves individual autonomy or identity versus those
who see it as protecting communal governance or social utility arising from the maximization of knowledge. The argument here draws on each of these justifications. Nevertheless, its autonomy focus involves not individual expression, but individual access to
knowledge that enhances well-being. Although the distinction, drawn by the social utility and democratic consent theorists, between public discourse and private speech is not
relevant here, all speech is not equally important. Heightened protection is afforded to
speech that furthers the bringing of knowledge to bear on important autonomy interests,
especially in the areas of religion, justice, and health.
It may also be noted that Justice Scalia has suggested that when First Amendment
guarantees operate "in conjunction" with other constitutional guarantees of rights,
heightened protection may be warranted. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
881-82 (1990).
232
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The press rights of the book publisher join the right to know of the reader.
The speech rights of the lawyer join the Sixth Amendment and due process
rights of the client. Finally, the physician's speech interests meet the
patient's interest in bodily health and control that the Court has protected in
233 Vitek v. Jones,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,
235
Youngberg v. Romeo, Roe, and now Casey.

c. The Pervasiveness of State Regulation of a Profession's Knowledge
Practices

Before identifying in the next section the limits free speech principles
should place upon state regulation of professional speech, it is best to acknowledge that professions are not only strongly empowered but also heavily regulated by the law.236 Through delegations of authority, rules of organization, powers to license others,237 and exemption from antitrust and other regulations, the law organizes, empowers, and regulates a profession to
enable it to function effectively as an institution of knowledgeY Many of
these general empowering regulations have only incidental effects on the
specific content of a profession's knowledge practices. But some of the
government's actions have a substantial and direct impact, especially those
involving funding at the macro level.
Legal regulation of the case is also extensive. The common law has
effectuated substantial change in the theory of the case in the last thirty
years, in the direction of client autonomy. For example, the common law
prohibits physician speech to third parties to protect confidentiality, compels
physician speech in the nature of disclosures to assure effective client consent and understanding of his medical situation, and shapes physician speech
to protect the client from harm.239 The interests of the professional in
speaking as an individual without constraint are subordinated on behalf of
the autonomy and welfare of the client in whose service the professional has
undertaken to act. Such client-centered regulation advances and vindicates
society's interest in developing, reproducing, and disseminating knowledge
through the case.
The pervasiveness of the empowering regulations of a profession as a
whole, and the restraining regulations of the professional-client relationship

--3 497 U.S.
445 U.S.
23 457 U.S.
236 See, e.g.,

261 (1990).
480 (1980).
307 (1982).

A COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL LAws, REGULATIONS AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HEALTH LAW (Wayne J. Miller ed., 1989).
"' See Symposium, Private Accreditation in the Regulatory State, 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994).
238 See FREIDSON, supra note 230, at 9-13.
HEALTH CARE SOURCEBOOK:

" See infra notes 244-46.
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have led some, like Justice White, to believe that the First Amendment
offers little constraint upon such regulation."4 This misses the larger picture. Regulation of the profession-at-large and of the case maintains autonomous professions with practices that preserve and spread knowledge, simultaneously benefiting society and individual well-being. Regulations that
interfere with a profession's knowledge practices or seek to restrict the spectrum of knowledge are of a different and antagonistic nature.
d. The Scope of a Profession's Speech Rights: Regulation, Subsidy, and

Rust
An affirmative free speech claim for professionals may now be stated:
Through its empowerment and regulation of the learned
professions, the law advances society's interest in having
knowledge organized, developed, transmitted from generation
to generation, and brought to bear on behalf of individuals.
To prevent the law's general regulation of a profession from
intruding on its knowledge practices, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may be of service, as may the principle
that bars regulation that intends to or has the effect of suppressing expertise or contracting "the spectrum of available
knowledge.""
With respect to the case, professional free speech rights
protect communication, not on matters of public discourse or
of purely private interest, but rather with respect to the
professional's communication of knowledge for the client's
benefit. Such protected speech advances the client's access to
knowledge, especially knowledge that enhances his autonomy and well-being with respect to religious activity, access
to justice, and pursuit of health.
We now turn to a more specific consideration of this claim.
i. Regulating the Case to Protect a Client's Autonomy or Welfare

The government may regulate the speech of professionals within a case
to protect the autonomous choices of the competent client, or his best interests if he is incompetent. It may do so through the tort of malpractice
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
241 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (holding that the state must not "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of
'o

dangerous ideas."').
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and other such actions-that is, through a decentralized legal decisionmaking process that tailors judgment to the particular facts of each case and that
intervenes only when a client claims harm. It may also prescribe regulatory
rules rather than tort standards. Because such rules may diminish the discretionary power of the physician to tailor messages in furtherance of the particular patient's autonomy and well-being, some limit of reasonableness
should exist with regard to such regulations. The Supreme Court's cases that
address professional speech all recognize the broad power of the state to
regulate professional speech to protect the interests of the client. 42
ii. Wedging

the

Government's Message into the Professional

Relationship
The Constitution certainly disables the state from wedging its message
into a priest-penitent relationship. It probably also disables such a wedging
in the counsel-client relationship other than in open court. Similarly, Akron
and Thornburgh rejected the state's insertion into the doctor-patient relationship of a message that was motivated not by an interest in patient autonomy,
but by hostility to abortion choice: such a message was said to distort the
relationship and inhibit the speech interests of doctor and patient." By

2

See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376-77 (1995); SEC v.

Lowe, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,

638 (1985); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1978); In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); cf Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 106-11 (1990); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379-81 (1977). See generally Alfred C. Aman, SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the First Amendment, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 93.
" The Court in Akron held that
Danforth's recognition of the State's interest in ensuring that this information be
given will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth.... [M]uch of the information
required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her
to withhold it altogether.
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983), overruled in

part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Some of the requirements in Akron involved matters that were "at best speculation"
(such as the "anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn
child"), "dubious" (that "abortion is a major surgical procedure"), a "'parade of
horribles' intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure," or
inconsistent with Roe ("that the unborn child is a human life from the moment of con-

ception"). Id. at 444-45.
In addition, Akron held that these requirements were flawed because they are an
"intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician" requiring him to
recite information regardless of his judgment as to its relevance, such as the particular
risks. Id. at 445. Although the government may require that the patient be informed of
the "physical and emotional implications of having an abortion," Akron's requirement
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contrast, the Casey joint opinion concluded that Pennsylvania's particular
message-one that was neither false nor intended as a substantial obstacle-was compatible with the proper functioning of the professional relationship.
The relevant First Amendment inquiry regarding such a required
message's impact on professional speech differs from the captive audience
analysis discussed above. Such an inquiry requires a fact-specific analysis of
whether the intrusion of the state's message distorts the case as a medium
for information exchange and for effective care and research. Does the
state's intervention distort the contents of the conversation or diminish the
patient's trust and belief in the physician's undivided commitment to her
well-being, which allows for the frank conversations that form the basis of
knowledge transmission?
The common law governing physician-mandated disclosures illustrates
an appropriate concern about distorting the professional relationship. It does
not simply assume that more speech is always better for doctor and patient.
For example, it limits access to the patient by other potential speakers by
providing that the relationship be conducted in relative privacy. 4 Tort regimes set reasonable limits on mandated disclosures in the informed consent
process because too much information can overwhelm the judgment of the
patient and can interfere with the reasoned application of the profession's
general statistical information to an individual's own life choices.245 Finally, the common law recognizes a therapeutic privilege, allowing physicians
to withhold information altogether for the patient's benefit.246 A similar
sensitivity should inform the First Amendment inquiry here.
iii. Restricting the Messages that the Physician May Impart
After the propaganda warning in Keene came the movie. Similarly, after
the state's brochure or videotape, the physician has her turn. May the state
prohibit a physician from contradicting or commenting upon the state's
message to prevent her undermining or limiting its impact? May the state

of a "lengthy and inflexible list of information ... unreasonably has placed 'obstacles
in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision."' Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
By contrast, the Court noted in dicta that a requirement that the patient be informed
of her pregnancy, the gestational age of the fetus, the availability of information on
birth control and adoption, and of assistance during pregnancy and after childbirth is
"not objectionable" if "accurate." Id. at 445-46 n.37.
244 See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 529-33 (Or. 1985) (en
banc).
" Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
246 Id. at 786.

19961

READING CASEY

867

even go so far as to prohibit the doctor from mentioning certain facts to the
247
patient that are inconsistent with the state's message?
Such a prohibition could be far more distorting of the doctor-patient
relationship than the insertion of the state's own message. It would certainly
interfere with the two-way information exchange between doctor and patient. In addition to inhibiting the research aspect of the case, such a prohibition would directly interfere with the patient's interest in accessing information through the institution that makes such information available. Patients look to physicians for health information and rely upon what they are
told; thus, a limitation upon disclosure limits the information they actually
get. Warning patients not to engage in the social practice of relying on
physicians for certain information would not eliminate the problem, and
would do nothing for their liberty interest. It is not altogether possible for
patients to go elsewhere, because it is in the nature of the information that
professionals impart to be partially unavailable in library form: professionals
bring general knowledge to bear on individual cases through a combination
of their education, practical wisdom, experience, and knowledge of the particular interests of the client. Moreover, a patient's emotional dependence on
a physician makes this image of forum-shopping for knowledge utterly unrealistic. 4 Finally, it is said that availability elsewhere does not negate the
First Amendment harm resulting from an intentional suppression of
speech. 9 Whatever its general validity, this principle should certainly apply in the case of the best source. In this instance, the best source is a physician: she is society's repository of specialized medical knowledge and its
expert in the application of this knowledge to the particular case."

" States via professional licensing boards have the power to silence a physician's
speech as they can silence other professionals for the benefit of clients. They can remove his license to practice for cause, and then subject him to criminal and civil penalties for engaging in professional speech to a client. Yet he remains free to speak to the
public at large provided he does not purport to offer individualized professional advice.
See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
24 "The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only [her] physician to whom [she] can look for enlightenment with which to
reach an intelligent decision." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
2' See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
757 n.15 (1976); see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230
(1987); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 n.18 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980); cf Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 913 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (inquiring whether
an idea is "readily available from the same source in other accessible locations").
25 Because the state creates a monopoly in the practice of medicine on behalf of
doctors, a prohibition on medical speech is especially inhibiting on the dissemination of

information.
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iv. Non-Subsidy Decisions: Rust v. Sullivan

Restrictions on speech in the case undermine it as a vehicle for information transmission and development, regardless of whether the restrictions
arise from a state's regulation or its refusal to fund. 1 When the government funds a physician, it funds a constitutionally protected organized realm
of knowledge. When the government declines to fund some physician
speech-as distinct from practice-it unjustifiably interferes with and distorts the delivery and development of professional knowledge, as the profession has come to define it. 2
To evaluate whether a profession's own definition of its knowledge
practices limits what the government can decline to subsidize, consider the
following hypothetical:
The Library of Congress issued a Request for Proposals
(RFP) for a new computer on-line retrieval system that
would replace its card catalogue with a computer system
permitting searches by author, title, and subject, of all books
in the library's collection. As the final plans for the project
were being completed, Representative Henry Hyde appended
to an appropriations bill an amendment that no money could
be spent by the Library of Congress to counsel library users
about abortion. Accordingly, an amended draft of the RFP
provided that "abortion" could not, on public terminals, be a
searchable subject in the database.
In response, a library user sued, claiming that this restriction violated her rights to receive information and constituted content-based discrimination among books. Although
this non-subsidy decision eliminated no books from the
library's collection, it violated the librarians' professional
251

In the parlance of unconstitutional conditions theory, the doctor-patient relation-

ship affords a "baseline" for judgment, see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problems of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984), or
provides the context for a careful First Amendment analysis without regard to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to Religion, Speech and
Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990), or cannot be bifurcated into different speech
components, in contrast to an organization's lobbying and educational activities, compare Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) with FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
252 For an excellent discussion of Rust and unconstitutional conditions that bears
similarities to arguments of this Part, see David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675 (1992).
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standards for organizing a catalogue, and interfered with the
public's access to such information-access which depends
upon professional librarians doing the job their professional
standards have defined. Posted warnings not to rely on the
computer or any librarian would not eliminate the distortion
created by the subsidy restriction.
The Solicitor General responded that the plaintiff had
mischaracterized the case. The First Amendment does not
require the Library of Congress to fund a computer database
program at all, or to provide any particular database system.
Accordingly, the government was free to organize its cataloguing scheme as it wants. One hundred Ph.D. theses demonstrating the hegemonic power of knowledge classifications
to suppress as much knowledge as they convey cannot lay
the groundwork for a free speech claim against any particular
classificatory scheme Congress might fund; indeed they
would only strengthen the point that Congress can fund
whatever scheme it prefers.
In this hypothetical, the Court should reject the government's position.
Although the government is not foreclosed from ever making a contentbased subsidy decision, it may not do so when its choice invades a socially
recognized institution of knowledge for the purpose of suppressing information that prevailing professional standards would normally make available to
clients.
Perhaps this example draws its force from the protections that libraries
traditionally have enjoyed as repositories of society's knowledge and not
from the professional status of librarians. 3 As an additional example, consider the hypothetical raised at the beginning of this section:
A state chooses not to fund public defenders to initiate
§ 1983 actions against police or prison officials. In addition,
the state determines that it will not fund public defenders to
counsel, or even inform, their clients about the existence of
such actions. Because of timing rules, no § 1983 action
would affect the criminal proceeding for which the public
defender was representing her client. As such, the § 1983
suit, formally, would be tangential to the attorney's obligation of effective representation.

" See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-69 (1982) (stating that the school library is the principal place where students may acquire knowledge); see also supra note 227.
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Prohibiting a public defender from informing her client about a possible
cause of action would violate the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship
and would intrude upon the legal profession's definition of the scope of the
attorney-client relationship. Such a result ought to preclude a state's nonsubsidy decision, or at least require a strong justification. The legal
profession's own principles should prevail, thus assuring that the lawyer
remains free to discuss all potential actions, even if only explicitly to limit4
the scope of the attorney's representation with respect to such actions. 5
Although this hypothetical derives some of its force from the independent
effect of the Sixth Amendment, the First Amendment by itself supports the
outcome.
Finally, the case of Rust v. Sullivan concerned a non-subsidy decision
involving physicians. Rust upheld regulations, implementing § 1008 of Title
X of the Public Health Service Act, which prevented funded physicians
from mentioning abortion during patient consultation.ui The regulations
scripted as a response to any patient question about abortion: "This program
does not consider abortion to be a form of family planning"; and it also
scripted a set of incomplete and inappropriate medical referrals for pregnancy. 6 The Court wrote:
A doctor who wished to offer prenatal care to a project patient who became pregnant could properly be prohibited from
doing so because such service is outside the scope of the
federally funded program. The regulations prohibiting abortion counseling and referral are of the same ilk: "no funds
appropriated for the project may be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning," and a doctor employed by the project may be prohibited in the course of his
project duties from counseling abortion or referring for abortion. This is not a case of the Government "suppressing a
dangerous idea," but of a prohibition on a project grantee or
its employees from engaging in activities outside of the
project's scope. 7
The Court recognized, however, that this non-funding analysis does not
apply to all funding choices of the state. It does not apply to public fora:
"For example, this Court has recognized that the existence of a Government

2-4 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.2 (1983)

(noting that "a law-

yer may limit the objectives of his representation if the client consents after consultation").
" Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1995).

Id. § 59.8.
" Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991).
256
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'subsidy,' in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the
restriction of speech in areas that have 'been traditionally open to the public
for expressive activity,' or have been 'expressly dedicated to speech activity."' 2 Rust further recognized that this non-subsidy analysis does not apply to the university, which enjoys academic freedom:
Similarly, we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted
by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First
Amendment. 9
To put this differently, the government's non-subsidy choices are limited by
the university's autonomous jurisdiction over its own knowledge practices.
Moreover, there are hints in Rust that at least some Justices are open to
the arguments made here.26° The Court explicitly recognized that it may
not be a substantial extension to bring the learned professions within the
same protection that universities enjoy:
It could be argued by analogy that traditional relationships
such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the Government. We need not
resolve that question here, however, because the Title X
program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the
doctor-patient relationship. Nothing in them requires a doctor
to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact

Id. at 199-200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990)).
Id. at 200. Surely the opinion mischaracterizes the doctrine of academic freedom
when it grudgingly limits it to doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. Although vagueness concerns apply to subsidy and non-subsidy challenges alike, a precisely defined
rule of non-subsidy that interferes with academic freedom is impermissible. If the
Court's reference to overbreadth was meant to imply that a state may refuse to fund
"fighting-words" or "obscene" speech on campus (by defining its subsidy limitation
carefully), that may possibly be true. These two points, however, hardly exhaust the
scope of the doctrine of academic freedom. See generally Symposium, Freedom and
Tenure in the Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles,
53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1990).
260

Rust, 500 U.S. at 203, 215-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[T]he doctor-patient

dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust.... It is for this reason we have

guarded so jealously the doctor-patient dialogue from governmental intrusion." Id. at
218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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hold. Nor is the doctor-patient relationship established by the
Title X program sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify
an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive
medical advice. The program does not provide post-conception medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a
client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion
an appropriate option for her. 26 '
By so carefully distinguishing the specific relationship between the poor
female client and the family planning clinic from the general doctor-patient
relationship, the Court acknowledged the seriousness of the constitutional
claim for the protected status of a physician's speech. To reduce the constitutionally unacceptable possibility that the physician's enforced silence
would mislead the patient or constitute an endorsement-by-implication of the
government's message, the Court, in effect, altered the government's gag
rule regulation. It did so by characterizing the gag rule as permitting the
physician to dissociate herself from the government's position on abortion:
"The doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is
simply beyond the scope of the program. In these circumstances, the general
rule that the Government may choose not to subsidize speech applies with
full force."262 The Rust majority, or some portion of it, apparently took seriously the claim that the state cannot selectively decline to subsidize certain
case-related speech when such a refusal would "significantly impinge" upon
the doctor-patient relationship.263
Id. at 200.
Id. The Court seemingly modified the Health and Human Services (HHS) gag rule
regulation when it interpreted the emergency provision to permit counseling for medically necessary abortions. Id. at 195.
263 Id. at 200. Far from restricting the state's discretion, the role of professional judg261

262

ment and professional speech frees the state from profound difficulties. Independent
professional judgment helps the state make content-based decisions, especially funding
decisions, in a manner that avoids turning every decision into an ideological viewpointbased dispute. Thus, the government funds librarians to make choices according to professional standards that apply a priori criteria (of quality, representativeness, interest,
etc.) to choosing and cataloguing books. Congress funds National Public Radio (NPR),
the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)

and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) because there are identifiable
professional criteria regarding news and the arts that can be applied through professional judgment to the decisions these institutions make. These criteria in turn significantly
insulate the political branches from political responsibility and constitutional scrutiny for
the actions of each of these knowledge-generating institutions (largely, but of course not
entirely, as the NEA experience shows). Similarly, in non-speech cases, professional
judgment insulates a myriad of state decisions from constitutional scrutiny. For example, professional judgment insulates the state in hiring and firing decisions of publicly
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Rust erred only in its specific evaluation of the client-clinic relationship,
and in exempting this relationship from the protections that should be afforded to the "case." The Court did so with no justification other than what
it claimed to "know" about these female clients' knowledge and attitudes.' Although the application of a doctrine of professional speech requires a judgment as to what is and is not within the "case," there is an
established body of common law and professional practice on this subject
that the Court could have applied. Surely the Court got this aspect of Rust

wrong.
What may have led the Court astray in Rust was its sense that the state
regularly defines the purpose for which a professional or employee relationship is undertaken, and that the professional, therefore, merely brings technical expertise to bear on ends defined externally by the client or the
subsidizer: He who pays the piper calls the tune. 5 Indeed, most employees and many professionals possess an expertise that is solely technical; and
they employ it only to attain ends that are extrinsically determined. Such
persons for the most part enjoy First Amendment protection in their work
only when they can contribute to public discourse.2" This typically occurs
when they act as "whistleblowers," or, in some less dramatic way, use their
technical knowledge to disclose how, in the course of their employment,

funded private schools, in nursing home transfers of Medicare patients, in the care of
the mentally retarded in state schools, and in other similarly difficult decisions. See
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Such professional judgment also saves the
Court from what might otherwise be incoherent judicial choices in reviewing these
cases. If Rust were not interpreted in the limited fashion suggested by the text, it would
risk politicizing every choice, because every choice would ultimately be the state's own
value choice and not simply the result of its legitimate deference to an "apolitical" professional judgment. For one discussion of the role of professional judgment in constitutional law, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to
Abdication Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
'
Dorothy Roberts has written compellingly of the plight of the women, children,
and families harmed by the Rust decision. See Dorothy Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and
the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993). Her analysis of Rust
focuses on a general right to know. She is, however, critical of professional power and
sees professions as repressive agents of social control and spinners of hegemonic obfuscation. This ignores the role of professions as mediating and countervailing institutions
that shelter and protect individual autonomy and well-being and instantiate those values
in our society.
' Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-94; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
884 (1992).
26 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968); id. at 568 (noting
that an employee's First Amendment protection in his work depends upon "a balance
between the interest of the [employee] ... in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting ... [the] services it
performs through its employees").
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publicly defined ends are subverted or not achieved. For example, the public
has an interest in the testimony of a NASA engineer concerning an O-Ring
failure in the space shuttle, or in the speech of a teacher concerning the
misuse of school revenues.267

By contrast, learned professions employ their expertise for purposes that
are not entirely extrinsic to the profession. Professions play a part in defining the ends they seek by interpreting the animating principles of their disciplines-principles of justice, health, and faith. The needs of clients complete
the definition. Consequently, a state's non-subsidy decision that restricts
speech on the mistaken grounds that such speech is outside the funded
"ends" of the professional relationship subverts the case as a center of
knowledge transmission and development.
The distinction between employees and learned professionals also helps
to clarify the physician's claim that her enforced silence amounts to compelled speech endorsing the government's position. The state often requires,
as a rule of employment, that its employees adhere to accepted scripts in
speaking with the public on job-related matters. Although such a script also
enforces silence, this simply involves remaining "in role" for an employee
whose allegiance is to the ends his employer defines, and not to a professional standard. For a professional, however, enforced silence amounts to
coerced endorsement when the silence results in the breach of her allegiance
to her profession's knowledge practices and to her client.
To summarize, a physician's speech rights leave her free to dispute the
state's message with her patient, and to make an as-applied challenge should
the state's scripted message prove disruptive of the doctor-patient relationship.
C. Self-Governance: The Special Example of Voting
Part IV has argued that when the government speaks to a woman at a
clinic in a way that cannot be justified as furthering her informed consent,
Casey requires that such speech must still be truthful and that it not undermine her deliberative powers.268 This standard received some elaboration
from a First Amendment analysis of the captive audience problem, the targeting of pregnant women, and the speech rights of physicians. Aside from
these considerations, Casey may be read as leaving room for the states to
communicate ideas that do not enhance a woman's autonomy.

26

See id. at 568; see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1884 (1994);

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983); cf Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist.,

439 U.S. 410, 411-17 (1979).
26

Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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Nevertheless, one reason still remains for reading Casey's joint opinion
as affording less leeway to government-scripted speech than this analysis
has suggested, and as restricting state partisanship in favor of a more modulated and respectful approach to the pregnant woman. That reason relates to
a comparison the joint opinion made to voting. In explaining its analysis of
the state's power to structure the decisionmaking process, this opinion drew
an analogy to the state's power to structure the voting process, noting "we
have held that not every ballot access limitation amounts to an infringement
of the right to vote. Rather, the States are granted substantial flexibility in
establishing the framework269 within which voters choose the candidates for
whom they wish to vote.
In the arena of voting, the state adheres to a principle of speech neutrality. It does so to guard against the self-interest of government officials and to
further the nation's commitment to citizen self-government. Aside from the
speech of a few leading political officials, the government's pre-election
speech is umpireal.27 The state arranges the ballot in a manner that should
not favor a particular outcome. When it undertakes educational efforts, it
similarly endeavors to maintain a careful neutrality. For example, because of
the state's multiple and complex initiatives, the California Secretary of State
attempts to educate the electorate by distributing voter pamphlets long before election day.27 ' The government's own speech is limited in what it
says in the voter pamphlets. Aside from a brief factual account from a legislative analyst, the government merely reprints short statements from the
opposing parties in the initiative process. The statements are only revised to
prevent false and deceptive statements of fact.272
Furthermore, all persuasive and educative speech ends prior to the time
a voter actually casts her vote. The voting booth assures privacy. Moreover,
states typically establish an enlarged zone of non-persuasion by excluding
"electioneering" from the polls' immediate vicinity. 273 This protects autonomous choice and independence of judgment: one should not be influenced
by pressure or advice brought to bear shortly before a private decision.274

at 873-74.
Dean Yudof describes the core problem of state speech as its power to "falsify
consent" to state power. Mark G. Yudof, In Search of a Free Speech Principle, 82
MICH. L. REV. 680, 702 (1984).
" See Carol Federighi, Regulating Slate Mailers: Consumer Protection or First
Amendment Infringement?, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567 (1992).
272 Id. at 578-79.
273 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that Tennessee statute
269Id.

prohibiting solicitation of votes and display or distribution of campaign materials within
100 feet of entrance to polling place did not violate First Amendment); see also
Schirmer v. Edwards, 2 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994).
274 Voting regulations under the National Labor Relations Act have shown special
sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of dependent workers and have led to even greater con-
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If the Justices take their voting analogy seriously, they may require the
government to speak of abortion, if not with neutrality, at least with some
reticence and circumspection, and, as the joint opinion put it, in a manner
"calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."'2 75 Such a
constrained government speech model may be hard to distinguish from the
autonomy model discussed in Part II.
The reason to believe that the Casey joint opinion takes this voting analogy very seriously is found in its partial reconceptualization of the abortion
right. The opinion anchors the right to an abortion not only in the doctrine
of privacy, but also in the principles of equal citizenship: "The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation
'
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."276
Perhaps for some Justices, when a woman decides a matter that falls
within the ambit of the privacy doctrine and that involves only her self-definition (and her familial commitments), the government may speak to her in
a partisan manner and urge a particular conception of herself, especially
with respect to parenthood. The joint opinion, however, links the abortion
decision not only to such a private self-definition, but also to a woman's
place as an equal citizen of the Republic, who participates in its market and
its public life.2' Thus, the arguments for government neutrality gain
strength, lest partisan government speech undermine the self-governance of
women that is a precondition to their autonomous participation in our mutu-

straints upon employer speech near the time of the vote. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994).
275

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).

27

See id. at 856; see also id. at 860 (noting that "an entire generation has come of

age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in
society, and to make reproductive decisions"). The reconceptualization of abortion
rights, however, occurred in the joint opinion's discussion of stare decisis, not in its
discussion of a woman's liberty interest.
In the legal field, the preference for equality-based rather than privacy-based arguments for abortion rights arises primarily from a search for a textual basis for Roe's
constitutional holding. The preference may also relate to the relative importance the
legal mind places on the public as compared to the private side of life. Finally, it relates
to the feminist concern that the concept of privacy leaves women subject to male violence and dominion within the family and leads to public disregard of the labor women
contribute to the family unit. For a discussion of the equality doctrine versus the privacy doctrine, see Sarah E. Burns, Notes From the Field: A Reply to ProfessorColker, 13
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1990); Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation:An Oxymoron ?---A
Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990); Ruth Colker, Reply to Sarah Burns, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 207 (1990); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male
Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Jay L. Garfield & Patrick
Hennessey eds., 1984).
277 Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-98.
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al governance. As with voting, the state may seek to inform her self-governance, but not to bias it.
V. CONCLUSION

A. Summary
This Article has read Casey as primarily authorizing states to exercise
more power in structuring the decisionmaking process of pregnant women
than Akron or Thornburgh allowed. It then explored three ways in which a
state may seek to exercise this power, and measured these alternatives
against the restrictions identified in Casey, in First Amendment doctrine, and
in the internal logic of the alternatives' proffered justifications. Because
Casey reaffirms women's autonomy in reproductive matters, the state can
seek to "protect the fetus" only through educating and informing women
about their choices. The principle of informed consent establishes one set of
criteria, empirically verifiable, by which to assess government regulation.
This principle also requires the state to acknowledge that when it speaks in
opposition to abortion, it may not be speaking for the woman's benefit, but
to further its own ends. When the state speaks to further its own ends, different doctrines, mainly of First Amendment origin, establish other, if looser, constraints on government speech.
If this reading is correct, the state's range of permissible policies is far
more restricted than may have appeared upon an initial reading of Casey.
The state may regulate the doctor-patient relationship to protect a woman's
autonomy, both narrowly and broadly conceived. The state may intervene
paternalistically by mandating a twenty-four hour waiting period, at least if
it proves that such a period in fact contributes to a woman's decisional
autonomy sufficiently to outweigh the very severe ways that the delay can
derogate from it, as the evidence of hardship arising from such waiting
periods incontrovertibly demonstrates. Furthermore, the state may not mandate that others participate in the doctor-patient conversation. Instead it may
add only its own voice.27 The state, however, may speak only if it does
not speak falsely, if it does not require the woman to listen, if it does not
speak in a manner that undermines rational choice or doctor-patient trust,
and if it does not prevent the physician from countering the government's
speech. This much is permissible. Under Casey, however, a state should riot
be able to go much further than Pennsylvania has gone in regulating abortion.

278

States should consider using the disclosure pamphlet included in the Surgeon

General's Report on Abortion, prepared under Surgeon General Koop. See 135 CONG.
REC. E906-02 (1989) (extension of remarks of Rep. Weiss).
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The joint opinion's political insight into the abortion controversy may
prove to be remarkable. What counts for the joint opinion is what Glendon
emphasizes: the expressive function of the law. More speech, in its sensible
view, is the appropriate answer to this deep controversy. Women have an
understandable need for informational privacy, given the extraordinarily
private nature of procreative decisions and the coercion and violence of antiabortion groups and spouses. A woman, therefore, must be free to exercise
her choice in private and without accounting for it to any other member of
the community. Under these circumstances, the state itself-within the constraints discussed herein-can undertake an expressive function in speaking
about the facts and values that are significant to the elected branches of the
political community. Through such speech, an accommodation between a
woman's autonomy and the government's asserted interests may be
achieved.
B. A Different Conversation

If the center of the Court holds with Casey, then the abortion liberty
may have a less anxious existence than it had during the 1980s. If so, then
both sides of the debate have an additional responsibility to talk and think
about abortion openly and non-defensively. We shall need to attend to our
language and the way we talk to others: those who agree and disagree. Although the language of rights stakes out the rules by which we live, it cannot supply the language for how we choose to live and communicate with
each other. This does not mean sacrificing the hard-won understanding that
women control their fertility and do so without apology. Nevertheless, if
Casey secures those rights in Roe, it should be easier to speak to each other
in a more inclusive language.
That includes greater attention to those women who claim to be victims
of abortion choice. They might have been victims of adoption, of single
motherhood, or of violent marriages; perhaps they were victims in other
ways as well. Yet some may suffer simply because they believed something
different from those who are pro-choice, and did not enjoy the luxury of
having their beliefs about abortion conform with their responsible procreative behavior.
That also involves creating space for those who experience sadness over
abortions, an experience that these women argue is essential for coping with
and assimilating the abortion experience.279 One step in creating such a

From his study of Japan's response to abortion, Lynn Wardle advises creating
such a space for sadness. See Lynn Wardle, "Crying Stones": A Comparison of Abor279

tion in Japan and the United States, 14 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 185

(1993). Those who wish to follow Wardle's advice to study Japanese attitudes about

abortion should consult

WILLIAM R. LAFLEUR, LIQUID LIFE: ABORTION AND BUDDHISM
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space requires anti-abortion groups to abandon their rage. Plainly, sadness
will not be experienced in response to such anger."
Ronald Dworkin, in his book Life's Dominion, suggests that in talking

about abortion, we must reclaim a mutual understanding which promotes a
reverence for life.2"1 Although some value the biological contribution and
others the social contribution to life, he movingly argues that we must build
a conversation that is united over its sacredness. As powerful as his claim
is, I do not think that our politics needs first and foremost an analysis based
on some abstract ethic of life which unites a discussion of abortion with
discussions of euthanasia, capital punishment, animal rights, war, and terrorism. 2 Rather, the subject of abortion is about sexuality 3 and motherhood, about families and procreation, and about the care of the children we
have. This is a far more pressing conversation.
Outside abortion clinics, some anti-abortion groups seek to enter a conversation with women to persuade them to continue each and every pregnancy; and some engage to support them in this latter choice throughout gestation (Others, of course, violate conditions of conversation with infliction of

emotional distress, harassment, coercion, and violence, up to and including
murder). The joint opinion now opens the way for the state to join this conversation at clinics. Nevertheless, there is a far better conversation that a

IN JAPAN (1992). Indeed, this excellent book is one of the essential books for anyone

interested in the subject of abortion.
2 One suspects that reducing the rage stemming from anti-abortion groups' rhetoric
would have a variety of beneficial effects on the class of women who may be at psychological risk from having an abortion. The rage itself may heighten trauma. The coercive and violent protests likely increases the stress of the procedure, reduces the number
of well-trained physicians available to perform abortions, and reduces the opportunities
for calm and reflective counseling. Cf Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for
Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in
Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming spring 1996) (describing
negative medical sequelae of antiabortion demonstrations on patients); Alan E.
Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting Free Speech Rights
Under State Constitutions on the Property of Private Medical Clinics ProvidingAbortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1182-85 (1991) (describing how abortion
protesters affect patients seeking abortions).
281 DWORKIN, supra note 157, at 14-15.
282 A conversation about abortion is only partially aided by analogies drawn from the
ethics and law of homicide, of good samaritan obligations, and of war. The subject of
procreation, including abortion, is sui generis. For one discussion of terrorism, see
KEVIN TOOLIS, REBEL HEARTS: JOURNEYS WITHIN THE IRA'S SOUL (1996).
2"3 In a utopian moment, West describes the elective abortion right as a contingent
right, appropriate during patriarchy's reign-as if female sexuality, undistorted by male
power, would be at one with female procreativity and both would be at one with female
reason. See Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on
ProfessorBrownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 965-67 (1994).
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woman can have: a conversation within herself, and, if she chooses, as she
often does, with her friends or family. This conversation involves the question of what she intends to do with her loving and generative potential,
whether that includes begetting, bearing, and rearing her own children, and
in addition or as an alternative, caring for others, for communities, and for
ideas. These questions involve a lifetime of dialogue. They cannot be condensed nor should they be in a few minutes at a clinic door. That better
conversation of how persons use their generative potential is an ethical one
that broadens the focus from any one pregnancy to a way of living in a
particular community. Within this context, the protection of family life and
the wonders of sexuality may be understood and the character of the participants in this dialogue, how they care for their loved ones, their work, and
their community, may be evaluated. The focus of this inquiry may engage
adults-women and men alike-in a coequal dialogue about how all participants will actualize their particular generative caregiving potential in our
society.'

Paragraph adapted from

GOLDSTEIN,

supra note 19, at 88-89.

